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Abstract: Upon more than 400 judgements on direct taxation, the case law of the European Court of 
Justice has considerably shaped Member States’ tax systems. Based on Member States’ tax law ad-
justments in the context of four landmark rulings on corporate income taxation, we analyse whether 
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ology. Overall, we find that due to Member States’ mostly heterogeneous adjustments and varying 
levels of compliance, cross-border investment continues to be discriminated in some Member States 
following the Marks & Spencer and National Grid Indus judgements. In addition, differences in the 
general availability of the rules under scrutiny and design of related provisions, cross-country differ-
ences in effective tax burdens and hence distortions to the internal market might persist. We conclude 
that a comprehensive harmonisation of Member States’ tax systems by way of positive integration 
would be necessary to sustainably eliminate tax obstacles to cross-border business activities. 
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1. Introduction 
The European Union (EU) does not have any mandate to harmonise direct taxes across Member 
States. Therefore, case law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has become a decisive de-
terminant for the development of European tax systems and European integration.1 As of 2019, 
the ECJ has decided around 400 cases on Member States’ rules for direct taxation.2 In its land-
mark “Avoir Fiscal”3 judgement of 1986, the ECJ established that – despite their sovereignty 
in the field of direct taxes – Member States must not infringe the fundamental freedoms.4 Fol-
lowing this judgement, ECJ case law “has gained both momentum and significance”.5 As such, 
it contributes to the long-term objective of the EU regarding the establishment of an internal 
market in terms of an “area without internal frontiers” that features, among others, “free com-
petition” as well as “an efficient allocation of resources” (Art. 26 (2), 120 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)).6 The realisation of the internal market is thus 
contingent on the four fundamental freedoms (free movement of capital, goods, labour and ser-
vices) as well as on the prohibition of cartel agreements, State aid or misuse of market power.7 
The legal impact of ECJ case law has been subject to detailed studies: On the one hand, legal 
literature includes numerous detailed discussions of single rulings and their implications for the 
tax laws of the affected Member States.8 These considerations, however, are predominantly 
limited to the Member States that are directly affected by a particular ruling and exclude poten-
tial adjustments that have likewise been adopted in other Member States.9 On the other hand, 
legal literature analyses the development of European judicature in different fields of tax law.10 
In contrast, evidence on the economic impact of case law on, for example, investment condi-
tions or Member States’ location attractiveness is comparatively scarce:11 For instance, 
Bräutigam et al. (2017) analyse the implications of the ECJ’s decision in the Cadbury 
                                                 
1 See Panayi (2010), p. 267. 
2 See European Commission (2018) for a list of cases in the field of direct taxation. 
3 ECJ, 28 January 1986, Case 270/83, Commission of the European Communities v French Republic (“Avoir 
Fiscal“). 
4 See Lazarov (2018), p. 63, para. 195. 
5 See de la Feria/Fuest (2016), p. 53. 
6 See also Bräutigam et al. (2017), p. 720. 
7 See Adamczyk/Majdańska (2018), pp. 2 f., para 3. 
8 Among many others, see, for instance, Gutmann/Hinnekens (2003); Vinther/Werlauff (2003); Hintsanen/Pet-
tersson (2005). 
9 A case study edited by Brokelind, however, provides a comprehensive overview on “how domestic courts, tax 
authorities and legislators cope with their duty to apply Community law, and especially, the ECJ’s case law in 
the field of direct taxation“, see Brokelind (2007), p. 7. Although information is reported on a country basis, 
the findings are ultimately consolidated towards an overall evaluation across Member States. 
10 Among many others, see, for instance, Lang (2005); Lang (2014); Sendetska (2014); Cordewener (2018); 
Kraft (2018). 
11 See also Bräutigam et al. (2017), p. 721. 
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Schweppes case and resulting limited applicability of controlled foreign company (CFC) rules 
for tax competition and neutrality in Europe. In addition to potential adjustments of Member 
States’ CFC rules, the authors include second round reactions where certain Member States 
implement special low-tax regimes for income from acquired intellectual property (so-called 
patent or IP box regimes). They consider different scenarios for the (in-) applicability of CFC 
rules and availability of patent box regimes and find that the Cadbury Schweppes ruling might 
have induced new distortions to cross-border tax neutrality in Europe. Besides, de la Fe-
ria/Fuest (2016) analyse the economic effects of Member States’ reactions to the Lankhorst-
Hohorst judgement on thin capitalisation rules based on a theoretical model. In light of varying 
tax levels across Member States and different reactions to the ECJ’s judgement, the authors 
conclude that tax distortions in the internal market might further increase.12 Schaper (2014a) 
reviews general trends in ECJ case law on direct taxation between 1983 and 2013 based on 
aggregated metadata, for instance regarding timing, geographical representation or subject mat-
ter. Furthermore, Schaper (2014b) identifies dominant judicial rules from the most important 
precedents in ECJ case law on direct taxation based on network analysis. Finally, Kube et al. 
(2016) conduct an interdisciplinary analysis and reflect on the past and future development of 
direct and indirect European tax law in order to derive implications for future direct tax policy. 
They suggest reinforcing negative integration and propose options for informal cooperation.  
So far, the economic impact of ECJ case law has only been evaluated on the basis of single 
judgments. Hence, none of the above-mentioned studies analyses the economic consequences 
of ECJ case law for the realisation of a European internal market in a more systematic and 
broader way, for example by evaluating several rulings across different areas of case law on 
direct taxation. Furthermore, there is only little evidence on how ECJ case law affects investors’ 
location decisions. This question is of high relevance since Member States’ tax law adjustments 
in the context of ECJ case law can affect the tax environment for corporate investments in the 
EU.  
Our paper contributes to the aforementioned interdisciplinary literature and intends to address 
the identified research gaps. The aim of the paper is twofold: In a first step, we investigate 
whether the judgements of the ECJ and Member States’ related tax law adjustments to the en-
hanced standards from the judgement have succeeded to eliminate tax-induced discriminations 
                                                 
12 In a prior working paper, the authors further considered the economic effects of reactions to the Marks & 
Spencer case regarding cross-border group loss consolidation. Since many Member States did not adjust their 
tax laws in response to that ruling, however, evidence on the economic effects of the Marks & Spencer case is 
ambiguous. See de la Feria/Fuest (2011), pp. 40, 46 f. 
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of cross-border investments in line with the mandate of the ECJ (qualitative analysis). In a 
second step and beyond the mandate of the ECJ, we evaluate the impact of Member States’ tax 
law adjustments on investment conditions in the internal market (quantitative analysis). To this 
end, we conduct a case study analysis on the effects of four landmark ECJ decisions that con-
cern different subareas of corporate taxation based on the effective average tax rate (EATR) 
determined according to the well-established Devereux/Griffith methodology for calculating 
forward-looking effective tax rates. We quantify how the four landmark decisions affect tax 
incentives in terms of EATR. This is a relevant measure because differences in EATR reveal 
investment distortions in the context of location choices. 
Overall, we find that apart from several Member States’ maintenance of discriminatory regula-
tions after the judgment in the Marks & Spencer and National Grid Indus cases, the ECJ seems 
to fulfill its mandate and achieves an equal tax treatment of domestic and cross-border invest-
ment choices. As such, the case law and Member States amendments to their tax laws contribute 
to eliminating tax distortions to investment choices between domestic and cross-border invest-
ments from the perspective of single Member States. To align their national rules with the en-
hanced requirements established by ECJ case law, Member States can generally adapt their 
rules in various ways. Due to heterogeneous adjustments, partly high levels of non-compliance 
as well as differences in the general availability of the rules under scrutiny across Member 
States, however, different country-specific outcomes in terms of EATR across Member States 
might even increase divergences in tax levels and hence tax distortions to investment location 
decisions in the EU. Therefore, a comprehensive harmonisation of Member States’ tax rules by 
means of directives (positive integration) seems necessary to realise an internal market without 
tax distortions to investment. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the ECJ’s approach 
towards the elimination of tax obstacles to cross-border business activities and the realisation 
of the internal market. In Section 3, we present the Devereux/Griffith model as the underlying 
methodological framework for the subsequent analyses of the implications of Member States’ 
adjustments to selected case law for the realisation of the internal market. In Sections 4 to 7, 
we first introduce the particular case under consideration and – if necessary – potential adjust-
ments to the Devereux/Griffith model framework to reflect the distinctive features of the rules 
in question. Subsequently, we present and classify Member States’ potential amendments to 
their tax legislation in the context of the case under consideration. As a last step, we quantify 
the related tax effects and discuss the implications for the realisation of the internal market 
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based on (otherwise fixed) country tax data of the year preceding the year when the judgement 
under consideration was given. In particular, we consider landmark cases in the context of thin 
capitalisation rules (Lankhorst-Hohorst decision, Section 4), intra-group loss relief (Marks & 
Spencer decision, Section 5), CFC rules (Cadbury Schweppes decision, Section 6) and exit 
taxation (National Grid Indus decision, Section 7). Considerations are limited to EU Member 
States at the time of the ruling, respectively. Section 8 concludes. 
2. European Court of Justice and its Approach towards the Realisation of the Common 
Market 
The foundation of the European Economic Community (EEC) by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 
envisaged the establishment of a common market in terms of common tariffs and other policies 
as well as the elimination of any other obstacles to cross-border trade.13 Upon the approval of 
the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987, the concept of the internal market was introduced to 
clarify the concept of a common market.14 According to Article 26 (2) TFEU, the internal mar-
ket is defined as an “area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, per-
sons, services and capital is ensured in accordance with the provisions of the Treaties”. As such, 
the fundamental freedoms are essential for the realisation of the internal market.15 
To achieve an internal market, two complimentary strategies exist that build on a different in-
stitutional approach:16 On the one hand, positive integration “follows the legislative process”17 
and relies on the implementation of harmonised common policies across Member States.18 Any 
measure adopted under positive integration shapes the development of the internal market19 
based on “explicit political legitimation”.20 As such, positive integration aims at policy integra-
tion including the introduction of common policies and the approximation of laws.21 On the 
other hand, negative integration contributes to the liberalisation of markets by eliminating com-
petitive distortions22 and hence strives for the “abolition of […] impediments to the proper op-
eration of an integrated area”.23 Negative integration is usually enforced through the “decisions 
                                                 
13 See de la Feria/Fuest (2016), p. 46. 
14 See de la Feria/Fuest (2016), p. 47. See also de la Feria (2009), pp. 29-35 on the co-existence of the common 
market and internal market concepts.  
15 See Bizioli (2017), p. 168. 
16 See Schmidt (2008), p. 301. 
17 See Schmidt (2008), p. 301. 
18 See Blauberger (2009), p. 1033; Craig/de Búrca (2015), p. 608. 
19 See Scharpf (1994), p. 484. 
20 See Scharpf (1998), p. 160. 
21 See Terra/Wattel (2012), p. 36. 
22 See Scharpf (1998), p. 157. 
23 See Tinbergen (1965), p. 76. 
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and case law of the [European] Commission and [ECJ]”.24 Positive and negative integration 
jointly achieve economic integration with the overall objective to realise an economic union.25 
According to Article 114 TFEU, the European Parliament and Council may adopt measures to 
harmonise Member States’ national laws in case this ensures the establishment and functioning 
of the internal market. More precisely, the harmonisation mandate is limited to areas where 
divergences in Member States’ respective tax rules obstruct the functioning of the internal mar-
ket.26 However, according to Article 115 TFEU, any such legislative measure requires Member 
States’ unanimous consent. In contrast to indirect taxes where Article 113 TFEU provides an 
explicit legal basis for harmonisation,27 among others, Member States’ hesitance to limit their 
sovereignty on direct tax matters and the unanimity requirement have inhibited major advances 
regarding the harmonisation of direct taxes.28 Hence, consensus for measures of positive inte-
gration seems easier to achieve “in policy areas where national interests converge”.29 To date, 
harmonised legislation on direct tax matters is still scarce30 and includes the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive (2011/96/EU),31 the Merger Directive (2009/133/EC)32 as well as the Interest and 
Royalties Directive (2003/49/EC).33 More recently – and within a record six months negotiation 
period – the Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive (ATAD I and II; 2016/1164/EU and 2017/952/EU)34 
was approved in July 2016 with the aim to transpose the results of the OECD’s Base Erosion 
and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project into Member States’ corporate income tax codes. However, 
it has been criticised that the resulting harmonisation was selective35 and that the underlying 
measures would not “promot[e] a common system of direct taxation”.36 So far, Member States 
                                                 
24 See Schmidt (2008), p. 301. 
25 See Pinder (1968), p. 90. 
26 See Terra/Wattel (2012), p. 3. 
27 See, for instance, Kube et al. (2016), pp. 248 f. for the development of indirect tax harmonisation among Mem-
ber States.  
28 See Terra/Wattel (2012), p. 37; de la Feria/Fuest (2016), pp. 51 f. 
29 See Scharpf (2006), p. 855. 
30 See also Blum/Langer (2019), p. 285 for an overview of enacted and potential future legislation on direct taxes. 
A detailed overview of direct tax harmonisation is also provided in Kube et al. (2016), pp. 249-251. 
31 Council Directive 2011/96/EU of 30 November 2011 on the common system of taxation applicable in the case 
of parent companies and subsidiaries of different Member States, OJ L 345/8 (29.12.2011). 
32 Council Directive 2009/113/EC of 19 October 2009 on the common system of taxation applicable to mergers, 
divisions, partial divisions, transfers of assets and exchanges of shares concerning companies of different Mem-
ber States and to the transfer of the registered office of an SE or SCE between Member States, OJ L 310/34 
(25.11.2009). 
33 Council Directive 2003/49/EC of 3 June 2003 on a common system of taxation applicable to interest and roy-
alty payments made between associated companies of different Member States, OJ L 157/49 (26.6.2003). 
34 Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules against tax avoidance practices that 
directly affect the functioning of the internal market, OJ L 193/1 (19.7.2016); Council Directive (EU) 2017/952 
of 29 May 2017 amending Directive (EU) 2016/1164 as regards hybrid mismatches with third countries, 
OJ L 144/1 (7.6.2017).  
35 See also Seiler (2005), p. 26. 
36 See Aujean (2010), p. 16. 
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could not find consensus on far-reaching harmonisation concepts such as the introduction of a 
Common (Consolidated) Corporate Tax Base (C(C)CTB).37 
For lack of a comprehensive harmonisation of direct taxation by means of positive integration, 
the ECJ holds an important “constitutional mandate to ensure the establishment of a European 
internal market” in terms of fiscal neutrality and a level playing-field.38 The ECJ’s approach of 
negative integration relies on market integration and constrains Member States’ tax sover-
eignty.39 To identify an unlawful discrimination or restriction of a fundamental freedom, the 
ECJ applies a transaction-based approach and compares the treatment of domestic and cross-
border investments.40 As such, ECJ case law might encourage both capital export neutrality 
(CEN) and capital import neutrality (CIN) among Member States to establish investment and 
financing neutrality.41 Under a tax system that satisfies CEN, an investor is taxed equally irre-
spective of the actual location where the investment is conducted. In line with CIN, by contrast, 
inbound investment is taxed independent of the actual residence country of the investor.  
If the ECJ holds a domestic rule incompatible with EU law, Member States can generally amend 
their tax laws in several different ways to ensure an equal treatment of domestic and cross-
border investment in line with the fundamental freedoms.42 On the one hand, they could extend 
a favourable domestic tax treatment to intra-EU cross-border cases and thus limit the applica-
bility of a discriminatory rule to cross-border cases with third countries. On the other hand, 
Member States could extend the scope of a discriminatory rule to cover also domestic cases. 
Besides, Member States could abolish the rule in question whereas they could likewise decide 
to maintain a rule that infringes EU law (non-compliant strategy). 
3. Methodology: Devereux/Griffith Model 
To estimate the impact of ECJ case law on the effective tax burden of firms situated in different 
Member States and its contribution to eliminating tax distortions to the internal market, we 
follow the well-established Devereux/Griffith methodology (1999, 2003).43 The model builds 
                                                 
37 See European Commission (2011) for the original as well as European Commission (2016a) and European 
Commission (2016b) for the re-launched proposals. See also de la Feria/Fuest (2016), p. 52; Kube et al. (2016), 
p. 253. 
38 See de la Feria/Fuest (2016), p. 45. 
39 See Terra/Wattel (2012), pp. 35 f. 
40 See Schreiber/Führich (2009), p. 259. 
41 See Schreiber/Führich (2009), pp. 258 f. For a detailed description of CEN and CIN as well as a discussion in 
the context of ECJ case law, see also Spengel (2003), pp. 257-259; Terra/Wattel (2012), pp. 210-222; 
Bräutigam et al. (2017), pp. 723-725. 
42 See also de la Feria/Fuest (2011), pp. 23, 35; de la Feria/Fuest (2016), p. 57 for the different types of reaction. 
43 For a detailed description of the model framework, see also Spengel (2003), pp. 68-77; Spengel et al. (2018a), 
pp. 171-174. The model has been used in various prior studies, see, for instance, Evers et al. (2015); Spen-
gel/Bergner (2015); Spengel et al. (2016a); Spengel et al. (2016b); Spengel et al. (2016c); Bräutigam et al. 
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on neoclassical investment theory and assumes a perfect capital market under certainty as well 
as successful real investment.44 The basic approach proposed by Devereux and Griffith consid-
ers a hypothetical domestic incremental investment either by a resident or non-resident com-
pany. This investment takes place in one period and generates a return during the next period. 
To analyse the effect of taxes on the return of the incremental investment, the model incorpo-
rates country-specific information on the type of tax system, types of applicable taxes 
(profit/non-profit), tax bases and tax rates on company and investor level.45 
The model distinguishes between marginal investments that just yield the minimum required 
return (relevant measures: effective marginal tax rate (EMTR) and cost of capital (CoC)) and 
profitable investments that earn economic rents (relevant measure: EATR).46 For purposes of 
this paper, we only consider the EATR with the aim to evaluate the impact of taxes on discrete 
location choices. More precisely, we aim to ascertain whether ECJ case law contributes to elim-
inating tax distortions to corporate investment location decisions across Member States. 
The EATR indicates the tax-induced reduction of the net present value (NPV) of profitable 
investment. From the perspective of an investor, a lower EATR for an investment alternative 
generally signals a higher attractiveness of the investment/location.47 It is computed as the dif-
ference of NPV before and after taxes (denoted by 𝑅∗ and 𝑅), divided by the discounted pre-
tax rate of return 𝑝: 
(1) 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅 =
𝑅∗−𝑅
𝑝 (1+𝑟)⁄
   
Alternatively, the EATR can be written as:48 
(2) 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅 =
?̃?
𝑝
∗ 𝐸𝑀𝑇𝑅 +
𝑝−?̃?
𝑝
∗ 𝜏 
In this case, the EATR corresponds to the EMTR if the pre-tax rate of return 𝑝 equals the cost 
of capital 𝑝. Upon increasing profitability, i.e. an increasing pre-tax rate of return, the EATR 
approaches the corporate income tax rate 𝜏. Hence, the EATR is mainly driven by the corporate 
                                                 
(2017); Pfeiffer/Spengel (2017); Spengel et al. (2018b) as well as the ZEW’s annual update on EU effective 
tax levels. For the latest update, see ZEW (2018). 
44 See Evers et al. (2015), p. 510; Pfeiffer/Spengel (2017), p. 21. 
45 As indicated by the annual update on effective tax levels in the EU; see ZEW (2018). 
46 See also Bergner (2017), pp. 200 f.; Olbert et al. (2019), p. 152.  
47 For a simplifying illustrative example and interpretation, see Spengel et al. (2018b), p. 62; Spengel et al. 
(2018a), p. 173. 
48 Personal taxes are neglected. See, for instance, Spengel et al. (2016c), p. 16 and for the derivation Deve-
reux/Griffith (1999), pp. 21 f. 
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income tax rate whereas the impact of tax base elements considerably diminishes for such in-
vestments.49  
We provide for a detailed description of the basic formulas of the Devereux/Griffith model as 
well as the underlying economic assumptions in Appendix A.1. 
In all subsequent sections, the economic effects of the particular case under consideration are 
evaluated separately based on country tax data of the year prior to the ruling to avoid any con-
founding effects from potential tax law changes in anticipation of the judgement. As such, all 
elements of the tax code remain fixed and only the particular rule under consideration is ad-
justed if Member States amend their laws in the context of the case.50 Considerations are further 
limited to those countries that were part of the EU during that particular year and are thus sub-
ject to mandatory compliance with ECJ case law.51  
We evaluate the realisation of the internal market based on two perspectives: First, as a bench-
mark for discrimination of cross-border investment, we consider a comparable domestic invest-
ment to determine a potential discrimination at country level. If the EATR of cross-border in-
vestment is higher than the EATR of domestic investment, domestic investment would be pre-
ferred which obstructs the realisation of the internal market from the perspective of the respec-
tive Member State. Upon an equal treatment of domestic and cross-border investment, the ECJ 
has fulfilled its mandate to ensure a non-discriminatory treatment of cross-border investment. 
Subsequently and in line with prior similar analyses, we consider both the mean and standard 
deviation of effective tax burdens across Member States before and after a particular judgement 
was rendered.52 As such, a declining cross-country spread in EATR might indicate a stronger 
alignment of tax burdens across Member States as well as a related elimination of tax distortions 
to investment location decisions towards the realisation of the internal market.53  
                                                 
49 See Devereux/Griffith (2003), pp. 112 f.; Spengel (2003), pp. 75 f.; Spengel et al. (2016c), p. 16. 
50 Information on Member States‘ potential tax law adjustments in the context of the respective judgements is 
derived from own research in the annual European tax handbooks published by the International Bureau of 
Fiscal Documentation (IBFD) and the IBFD’s online tax research platform (https://www.ibfd.org/). The judge-
ment under consideration is not necessarily (exclusively) causal for the amendments of Member States’ tax 
laws. Apart from being explicitly mentioned as one of the causes, we further assume that a legislative change 
(amongst others) relates to a particular judgement if it occurs the judgement’s immediate (temporal) context. 
51 Estonia applies a special corporate income tax system where only distributed profits are subject to tax while 
retained profits are tax exempt. As such, the Estonian corporate income tax code does not include any rules for 
the determination of taxable income. Hence, Estonia is only considered where suitable in the following sub-
sections, as most of the ECJ’s case law under consideration in this study would not have any impact. 
52 See Bräutigam et al. (2017), pp. 722, 732 who further refer to Devereux/Pearson (1995) and Elschner et al. 
(2011). Similarly, de la Feria/Fuest (2016), pp. 58-65, 71 consider differences in capital costs. 
53 Our results might reflect the upper bound of the changes in EATR for investments that yield a higher pre-tax 
rate of return as specified in the Devereux/Griffith model and vice versa. Still, they are of high relevance for 
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4. Interest Deduction Limitation Rules and the “Lankhorst-Hohorst” Case 
4.1. Case setting and preliminary remarks 
The “Lankhorst-Hohorst” case (C-324/00)54 was one of the first rulings on the conformity of 
national thin capitalisation rules with EU law55 and hence constitutes one of the Court’s land-
mark decisions.56 In the case at hand, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH, a German thinly capitalised 
corporation, received a loan from its Dutch grandparent that waived its claims for repayment in 
a related letter of support if claims by third parties existed.57 According to the former German 
thin capitalisation rules, interest payments on loans granted to a German resident corporation 
by a shareholder that was not entitled to a German corporation tax credit (typically a non-resi-
dent shareholder) were treated as a covert profit distribution if interest was calculated as a per-
centage of the loan and the debt-to-equity ratio exceeded a threshold of 3:1.58 However, there 
was no re-characterisation of deductible interest as a non-deductible deemed dividend if the 
loan was provided under arm’s length conditions, i.e. if an independent third party would have 
granted the loan under similar conditions.59 In contrast, interest was fully deductible irrespec-
tive of the underlying debt/equity ratio if paid to a domestic parent.60 Due to the high debt-to-
equity ratio of Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH and the related lack of securities that could have been 
provided to an external lender, German tax authorities treated the interest paid to the Dutch 
grandparent as a non-deductible covert profit distribution.61 In its ruling of 12 December 2002, 
the ECJ concluded that German thin capitalisation rules discriminated against inbound invest-
ment which was held incompatible with the freedom of establishment (Art. 43 EC).62 
                                                 
the policy debate since they nevertheless indicate whether it is possible to reduce tax distortions to investment 
location decisions among Member States. 
54 ECJ, 12 December 2002, Case C-324/00, Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v Finanzamt Steinfurt. 
55 See Gutmann/Hinnekens (2003), p. 90. 
56 See de la Feria/Fuest (2016), p. 57. 
57 See Lankhorst-Hohorst (C-324/00), para. 5-25 for the case setting and prior legal procedure. 
58 See Lankhorst-Hohorst (C-324/00), para. 3 for a brief overview of the underlying legislation. 
59 See Lankhorst-Hohorst (C-324/00), para. 3; Thoemmes et al. (2004), p. 127. 
60 See Lankhorst-Hohorst (C-324/00), para. 27-29. 
61 See Lankhorst-Hohorst (C-324/00), para. 11-12. 
62 See Lankhorst-Hohorst (C-324/00), para. 45. For a detailed legal description and discussion of the case, see, 
for instance, Gutmann/Hinnekens (2003). 
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In Section 4.3., we analyse the effects of the Lankhorst-Hohorst case from the perspective of a 
corporation that pays interest either to a domestic or to a foreign investor based on the reference 
year 2001. All country-specific criteria for the applicability of interest deduction limitation rules 
are held fulfilled. If a Member State restricts the deductibility of domestic and/or cross-border 
interest payments by whichever rule, we assume that such rules fully inhibit interest deducti-
bility and hence, increase the EATR (c.p.). We present the methodology in more detail in Ap-
pendix A.2.1. Unlike prior studies, our considerations also include rules that apply only among 
related parties which was quite common among Member States at the time of the Lankhorst-
Hohorst case.  
4.2. Member States’ tax law adjustments in the context of the case 
In Table 1, we provide an overview of the scope and availability of thin capitalisation rules 
across the EU-15 Member States before and after the ruling in the Lankhorst-Hohorst case.63 
Prior to the judgement, eight out of 15 countries under consideration restricted the deductibility 
of interest payments on intra-group loans from foreign shareholders. In this context, Belgium 
is the only country where the scope of the thin capitalisation rule also included interest pay-
ments to a domestic lender. Member States’ tax law adjustments in the context of the Lankhorst-
Hohorst judgement were quite heterogeneous: Four Member States excluded intra-EU situa-
tions from the scope of their thin capitalisation rules whereas three countries extended the in-
terest deduction limitation on intra-group loans also to domestic shareholders. Besides, Italy 
and the Netherlands newly introduced thin capitalisation rules in 2004.64 Especially in the case 
of Italy, the ECJ’s ruling in the Lankhorst-Hohorst case had a remarkable impact on the design 
of the regulation: Although the first draft bill excluded purely domestic situations from the 
scope of the thin capitalisation rules, the regulation was amended during the legislative process 
to cover both foreign and domestic lenders in order to avoid concerns on the incompatibility of 
the new rules with EU law.65 Accordingly, all Member States have adjusted their existing thin 
capitalisation rules and have ensured compatibility with EU law following the Lankhorst-
Hohorst judgement. 
                                                 
63 The presentation of country practice follows the general presentation by de la Feria/Fuest (2011), p. 33; de la 
Feria/Fuest (2016), pp. 66 f. However, the classification of Member States’ thin capitalisation rules partly 
deviates, which might be due to different assumptions with regard to the length of the period for Member 
States’ potential adjustments and/or the underlying information sources. See also Dourado/de la Feria (2008), 
pp. 2-16 for the development of interest deduction limitation rules across Member States up to 2008.  
64 See, for instance, Gusmeroli/Russo (2004) for the introduction of thin capitalisation rules in Italy. In the Neth-
erlands, thin capitalisation rules were introduced following the ECJ’s 2003 ruling in the “Bosal Holding BV” 
case (C-168/01); see Thoemmes et al. (2004), p. 127. 
65 See Gusmeroli/Russo (2004), p. 513; Rossi (2005), p. 89. 
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Table 1: Member States' adjustments following the Lankhorst-Hohorst case 
  
Scope of thin capitalisation rules 
Pre-Lankhorst-Hohorst Post-Lankhorst-Hohorst 
National EU Member States National EU Member States 
AT - - - - 
BE x x x x 
DE - x x x 
DK - x x x 
EL - - - - 
ES - x - - 
FI - - - - 
FR - x - - 
IE - x - - 
IT - - x x 
LU66 - - - - 
NL - - x x 
PT - x - - 
SE - - - - 
UK67 - x x x 
x = thin capitalisation rules available 
- = thin capitalisation rules not available 
The highlighted characteristics represent changes to the domestic rules that occur in the context of 
the Lankhorst-Hohorst case. 
4.3. Implications of the “Lankhorst-Hohorst” case for the realisation of the internal 
market 
In Table 2, we illustrate the EATR for a debt-financed investment of a corporation that pays 
interest either to a domestic or to a foreign lender before and after the Lankhorst-Hohorst ruling, 
respectively. The depicted values represent the combined tax burdens including the taxation at 
the level of the domestic or foreign lender. For the cross-border case, we consider all possible 
foreign lenders situated in any other EU-15 Member State. However, for the sake of clarity, 
Table 2 only includes the lender combination that yields the lowest and highest cross-border 
EATR for each interest paying entity resident in a particular Member State, respectively. 
Before the ECJ rendered its decision in the Lankhorst-Hohorst case, the unweighted average 
EATR for domestic loan arrangements is at 31.95% across Member States. The standard devi-
ation at 10.06 indicates a comparatively high cross-country spread in EATR. Upon lending 
from a foreign investor, the average lowest EATR at 31.31% is similar to the average EATR 
                                                 
66 In Luxembourg, interest deductibility is limited by administrative practice rather than codified national rules. 
As this approach does not represent a thin capitalisation rule in the strict sense, it is classified as the general 
absence of thin capitalisation rules. 
67 As of 1 April 2004, the United Kingdom’s thin capitalisation rules form part of the extended transfer pricing 
regime. We classify this as general availability of thin capitalisation rules due to the related legal codification. 
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for domestic lending whereas the average highest EATR is considerably higher (at 43.83%). 
The cross-country spread in EATR as measured by the standard deviation is equally quite high.  
Due to differences in the availability and scope of thin capitalisation rules, the consideration of 
country-specific EATR reveals important divergences in the treatment of domestic and cross-
country interest payments. Corporations resident in Member States that do not apply any thin 
capitalisation rules (Austria, Finland, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden) tend 
to have an incentive to shift taxable profits to low-tax countries through tax-deductible interest 
payments as a lower overall EATR can be achieved than in case of domestic intra-group lend-
ing. Before Member States have adjusted their thin capitalisation rules to ensure compliance 
with the Lankhorst-Hohorst judgement, cross-border investment was discriminated in Den-
mark, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom.68 
Member States’ amendments to their thin capitalisation rules following the Lankhorst-Hohorst 
decision align the treatment of domestic and cross-border interest payments and hence avoid 
any discrimination of cross-border investment. In all Member States except Ireland, the EATR 
of cross-border lending is (in part considerably) lower than for domestic lending which induces 
a preference for cross-border loan arrangements if the aim is to lower the overall tax burden of 
the group. However, depending on the underlying type of adjustment, the causes for the changes 
in preferences differ. In countries such as Germany, Denmark or the United Kingdom where 
the scope of thin capitalisation rules was extended to include domestic interest payments, the 
EATR for domestic intra-group lending increases and cross-border lending hence becomes the 
preferred investment choice. Other countries like France, Portugal and Spain limit the applica-
bility of thin capitalisation rules to loan arrangements with third country residents. In conse-
quence, the EATR for cross-border investment in part considerably decreases which reinforces 
the favourability of cross-border lending in order to minimise the group’s overall EATR. Italy 
and the Netherlands newly introduced comprehensive thin capitalisation legislation following 
the Lankhorst-Hohorst case. As the rules cover both domestic and cross-border interest pay-
ments, the EATR of any form of intra-group lending increases. Since the EATR for cross-bor-
der lending remains lower than the EATR for domestic lending, the introduction of thin capi-
talisation rules does not seem to alter the existing preference for cross-border lending that fol-
lowed from full interest deductibility before the Lankhorst-Hohorst decision. Overall, the ECJ 
                                                 
68 Since the Belgian thin capitalisation rule likewise covered domestic and cross-border interest payments already 
before the Lankhorst-Hohorst decision, there was no discrimination of cross-border investment. 
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thus seems to fulfill its mandate in eliminating tax obstacles to cross-border economic activity 
at country level. 
Only corporations resident in Ireland cannot decrease their tax burden below the level of do-
mestic lending upon a cross-border loan arrangement and would hence prefer to obtain the loan 
from a domestic affiliate. Besides, the EATR of a Greek resident corporation would be lowest 
if it obtains the loan from a Swedish affiliate. For corporations resident in any other Member 
State, lending from an Irish affiliate is the preferred investment choice as it yields the lowest 
overall EATR after the Lankhorst-Hohorst judgement.69 As such, although Member States’ tax 
law adjustments following the Lankhorst-Hohorst case contribute to eliminating tax discrimi-
nations to cross-border investment, the enhanced preference for cross-border debt financing 
might likewise contribute to intensifying tax rate competition for mobile investment capital 
among Member States. Besides, the spread in EATR for domestic lending increases upon the 
extended scope or introduction of thin capitalisation rules in five Member States (10.06 v 12.33) 
whereas the standard deviation for the lowest possible EATR slightly decreases for cross-border 
lending (9.18 v 8.55). Nevertheless, a remarkable divergence in (cross-border) EATR persists 
which continues to distort corporate investment location decisions. 
Upon the mandatory application of the ATAD as of 1 January 2019, Member States must im-
plement an interest deduction limitation rule in line with the earnings stripping rule established 
in Article 4 ATAD by 31 December 2018.70 This rule covers both domestic and cross-border 
interest payments. As evident from the above analysis of extended interest deduction limitation 
rules that include interest paid to domestic shareholders following the Lankhorst-Hohorst case, 
the obligation to implement interest deduction limitation rules – ceteris paribus – increases 
EATR levels for both domestic and cross-border interest payments in the countries affected.71 
Based on the above simplifying assumptions, this might contribute to a closer alignment of 
cross-country EATR. 
 
                                                 
69 Even if the preferred location of the foreign lender remains constant following Member States‘ tax law adjust-
ments to the Lankhorst-Hohorst decision, the underlying EATR might change. These changes trace back to 
changes in thin capitalisation rules in the residence countries of both the lessor and lender. 
70 In case Member States already dispose of an “equally effective“ interest deduction limitation rule, the transpo-
sition deadline is extended until 31 December 2023 (Art. 11 (6) ATAD). 
71 For a more recent overview of the availability of interest deduction limitation rules across Member States, see 
Bräutigam et al. (2019), pp. 541-543. 
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Table 2: EATR of a debt-financed resident corporation before and after the Lankhorst-Hohorst case (2001) 
  
Domestic tax burden [%] Lowest cross-border effective tax burden [%] Highest cross-border effective tax burden [%] 
Pre-Lankhorst-
Hohorst 
Post-Lankhorst-
Hohorst 
Pre-Lankhorst-
Hohorst 
Post-Lankhorst-
Hohorst 
Pre-Lankhorst-
Hohorst 
Post-Lankhorst-
Hohorst 
AT 31.17 31.17 25.74 25.74 38.49 38.49 
IE IE BE BE 
BE 54.07 54.07 43.35 43.35 49.76 53.77 
IE IE DE DE 
DE 38.08 53.53 42.09 42.09 54.52 54.52 
IE IE BE BE 
DK 26.80 40.92 32.73 32.73 45.36 45.84 
IE IE BE NL 
EL 30.40 30.40 27.12 28.29 37.52 37.52 
IT SE BE BE 
ES 46.70 46.70 43.03 30.84 55.44 43.50 
IE IE BE BE 
FI 27.21 27.21 22.91 22.91 35.73 37.43 
IE IE BE NL 
FR 36.64 36.64 42.52 29.75 55.03 42.51 
IE IE BE BE 
IE 9.36 9.36 15.43 12.90 36.40 38.15 
IT SE EL, NL NL 
IT 31.37 47.94 28.46 40.73 41.17 53.19 
IE IE BE BE 
LU 32.61 32.61 26.39 26.39 39.14 39.14 
IE IE BE BE 
NL 31.49 47.94 25.83 38.02 38.59 50.53 
IE IE BE BE 
PT 31.48 31.48 39.78 27.52 50.55 38.54 
IE IE BE BE 
SE 23.14 23.14 19.60 19.60 32.51 36.78 
IE IE EL, NL NL 
UK 28.70 42.83 34.63 34.63 47.24 47.62 
IE IE BE NL 
EU-15 
average 
31.95 37.06 31.31 30.37 43.83 43.84 
Standard  
deviation 
10.06 12.33 9.18 8.55 7.76 6.59 
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5. Deductibility of Foreign Final Losses and the “Marks & Spencer” Case 
5.1. Case setting and preliminary remarks 
Although the ECJ had already ruled on intra-company relief of cross-border losses before, the 
“Marks & Spencer” case (C-446/03)72 is of decisive impact and represents the first case on such 
relief within a corporate group.73 As such, it relates to the compatibility of the United Kingdom 
rules for group loss relief with EU law: Marks & Spencer plc was incorporated and registered 
in the United Kingdom and claimed group tax relief for losses of its foreign subsidiaries that 
had either ceased trading (Belgian and German subsidiaries) or had been sold to a third party 
(French subsidiary).74 The tax authorities in the United Kingdom denied such relief, however, 
and claimed that the possibility to surrender losses of another group company was restricted to 
domestic losses.75 In the related preliminary ruling of 13 December 2005, the ECJ held that this 
restriction infringed the freedom of establishment (Art. 43 EC/Art. 49 TFEU) if the foreign 
subsidiary (or any third party upon a sale of the subsidiary) had exhausted all possibilities to 
take account of the losses in prior, current or future periods.76 
To analyse the impact of the Marks & Spencer case on effective tax rates and hence, its contri-
bution to a better functioning of the internal market, we consider a parent company that splits 
its investment into a domestic investment in its residence state and a cross-border investment 
through its foreign subsidiary. The subsidiary’s investment yields a pre-specified negative re-
turn whereas the pre-tax return of the parent’s domestic investment is positive. Furthermore, 
we assume that the subsidiary’s loss is final, i.e. the subsidiary has exhausted all possibilities 
for taking the losses into account. In case intra-group loss compensation is available, the sub-
sidiary’s loss is attributed to the parent entity and reduces its taxable income accordingly. If no 
such consolidation mechanism is available, the parent entity must cover the final loss of its 
affiliate without any comparable tax relief. 
As a benchmark for the cross-border case, we analyse Member States’ respective tax treatment 
of loss-making domestic affiliates including the potential availability of a consolidation of intra-
group domestic losses. All calculations are based on 2004 tax data. 
                                                 
72 ECJ, 13 December 2005, Case C-446/03, Marks & Spencer plc v. David Halsey (Her Majesty’s Inspector of 
Taxes). 
73 See de la Feria/Fuest (2011), p. 35. 
74 See Marks & Spencer (C-446/03), para. 18-26 for the case setting and prior legal procedure. 
75 See Marks & Spencer (C-446/03), para. 24. 
76 See Marks & Spencer (C-446/03), para. 59. For a legal discussion of the Marks & Spencer case, see, for in-
stance, Lang (2006). 
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In Appendix A.2.2., we provide a detailed description of the amendments to the basic formulas 
of the Devereux/Griffith model. 
5.2. Member States’ tax law adjustments in the context of the case 
In Table 3, we summarise the availability and scope of intra-group loss compensation across 
Member States before and after the ruling in the Marks & Spencer case.77 Although intra-group 
loss compensation was available in 18 out of 24 Member States before the judgement, the mech-
anism was restricted to losses of domestic subsidiaries in the vast majority of Member States. 
It was only possible to surrender losses of foreign subsidiaries in Denmark, France and Italy. 
The European Commission has also emphasised that a lack or limited availability of cross-
border intra-group loss relief would not only favour large companies or companies situated in 
large Member States, but would also impede the realisation of the internal market by disad-
vantaging cross-border investments. As such, the European Commission has stressed the need 
to provide for an effective cross-border intra-firm and intra-group loss offset.78  
Member States’ tax law adjustments following the Marks & Spencer ruling were rather hetero-
geneous: Whereas five Member States extended the scope of cross-border intra-group loss relief 
to other Member States (or even third countries), only Slovenia denied the possibility of do-
mestic group relief and thus abolished intra-group loss consolidation altogether. The over-
whelming majority of nine Member States that granted unequal treatment to the group-wide 
surrender of domestic and EU-wide cross-border losses, however, maintained the former (dis-
criminatory) scope of their rules. As such, there are no common general characteristics of these 
Member States since they include both “old” and “new” Member States (e.g. Finland, Poland), 
large and small countries (e.g. Germany, the Netherlands) as well as high-tax and low-tax coun-
tries (e.g. Spain, Cyprus). No Member State newly introduced any form of intra-group surrender 
of losses following the Marks & Spencer case. 
Legal uncertainties regarding the scope of cross-border intra-group loss offset have been sug-
gested as a potential explanation for Member States’ maintenance of (discriminatory) regula-
tions after the judgement.79 Open questions included, for instance, the determination of the fi-
nality of a loss, the relevant timing for cross-border loss compensation as well as repercussions 
                                                 
77 The presentation of country practice follows the presentation by de la Feria/Fuest (2011), p. 39; de la Fe-
ria/Fuest (2016), pp. 66 f. 
78 See European Commission (2006), pp. 3, 10; de la Feria/Fuest (2011), p. 39. 
79 See de la Feria/Fuest (2011), p. 40. 
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on the design of domestic loss compensation rules and the associated distribution of tax reve-
nues.80 Furthermore, it was neither clear whether the scope of the judgement was restricted only 
to group relief systems that mirrored the United Kingdom’s model nor whether the principles 
of the ruling should also extend to intra-firm compensation of losses of a foreign permanent 
establishment.81 In fact, the ECJ departed from the principles established in Marks & Spencer 
in several partly contradicting subsequent rulings such as – among others – Lidl Belgium (C-
414/06),82 Oy AA (C-231/05),83 Krankenheim Ruhesitz am Wannsee (C-157/07)84 or K (C-
322/11)85.86 
Table 3: Member States' adjustments following the Marks & Spencer case 
  
Scope of intra-group loss consolidation 
Pre-Marks & Spencer Post-Marks & Spencer 
National EU Member States National EU Member States 
AT x - x x 
BE - - - - 
CY x - x - 
CZ - - - - 
DE x - x - 
DK x x x x 
EL - - - - 
ES x - x - 
FI x - x - 
FR x x x x 
HU - - - - 
IE x - x x 
IT x x x x 
LT - - - - 
LU x - x - 
LV x - x x 
MT x - x - 
NL x - x - 
PL x - x - 
PT x - x - 
SE x - x x 
SI x - - - 
SK - - - - 
UK x - x x 
x = intra-group loss consolidation available 
- = intra-group loss consolidation not available 
The highlighted characteristics represent changes to the domestic rules that occur in the context of 
the Marks & Spencer case. 
                                                 
80 See Lang (2006), pp. 61-63; Lang (2014), pp. 530 f. with further references. 
81 See Panayi (2010), p. 279. 
82 ECJ, 15 May 2008, Case C-414/06, Lidl Belgium GmbH & Co. KG v Finanzamt Heilbronn. 
83 ECJ, 18 July 2007, Case C-231/05, Oy AA. 
84 ECJ, 23 October 2008, Case C-157/07, Finanzamt für Körperschaften III in Berlin v Krankenheim Ruhesitz 
am Wannsee-Seniorenheimstatt GmbH. 
85 ECJ, 7 November 2013, Case C-322/11, K. 
86 See Lang (2014) as well as Panayi (2010), pp. 281-288 for a detailed overview and description of subsequent 
case law. 
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5.3. Implications of the “Marks & Spencer” case for the realisation of the internal 
market 
In Table 4, we illustrate the EATR in the loss scenario before and after the Marks & Spencer 
ruling. As such, the domestic case indicates the tax burden that would result if a parent entity 
has a loss-making domestic subsidiary whereas in the cross-border case it is assumed that a loss 
of similar amount is generated by a foreign subsidiary. The tax treatment of domestic or foreign 
group losses depends on the rules of the Member State where the parent is resident (Table 3). 
Before the Marks & Spencer judgement, the (unweighted) average EATR for a parent with a 
domestic loss-making subsidiary is equal to 21.04% whereas the (unweighted) average EATR 
for the case of foreign losses amounts to 21.90%. Group-wide surrender of losses was restricted 
to domestic losses in 15 Member States resulting in a different EATR for the domestic and 
cross-border cases. These differences vary between 0.62 percentage points in Ireland and 
2.02 percentage points in Spain with an average difference of 0.86 percentage points. Although 
the final loss must still be borne by the parent, it does not have any tax burden reducing effect 
if no group-wide loss relief is available. Hence, the tax burden in the cross-border loss case is 
higher if the scope of group-wide loss relief is restricted to domestic losses. The difference is 0 
in case Member States either do not grant group-wide surrender of losses at all or if such relief 
is also available for losses of foreign subsidiaries (Denmark, France, Italy). 
After the judgement, the (unweighted) average EATR for a parent with a domestic loss-making 
subsidiary slightly increases to 21.09% due to the overall abolition of group loss consolidation 
in Slovenia. For a parent with foreign losses, however, the (unweighted) average EATR slightly 
decreases to 21.65% as a result of the extension of group loss consolidation in five Member 
States. As evident from the zero difference between domestic and cross-border EATR, the treat-
ment of domestic and foreign losses is aligned in these countries.  
The (unweighted) average difference in tax burdens between the domestic and cross-border loss 
cases still amounts to 0.56 percentage points. Yet, as nine Member States continue to apply a 
different treatment for domestic and cross-border losses, there is no full alignment of the related 
EATR either.  
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Table 4: EATR in loss scenario before and after the Marks & Spencer case (2004) 
EATR 
Pre-Marks & Spencer Post-Marks & Spencer 
Domestic tax burden 
[%] 
Cross-border tax 
burden 
[%] 
Difference  
[percentage points] 
Domestic tax burden 
[%] 
Cross-border tax 
burden 
[%] 
Difference  
[percentage points] 
AT 28.02 29.72 1.70 28.02 28.02 0.00 
BE 27.46 27.46 0.00 27.46 27.46 0.00 
CY 9.07 9.82 0.75 9.07 9.82 0.75 
CZ 22.01 22.01 0.00 22.01 22.01 0.00 
DE 32.34 34.31 1.97 32.34 34.31 1.97 
DK 21.44 21.44 0.00 21.44 21.44 0.00 
EL 29.52 29.52 0.00 29.52 29.52 0.00 
ES 33.21 35.23 2.02 33.21 35.23 2.02 
FI 21.72 23.17 1.45 21.72 23.17 1.45 
FR 27.29 27.29 0.00 27.29 27.29 0.00 
HU 13.73 13.73 0.00 13.73 13.73 0.00 
IE 6.88 7.50 0.62 6.88 6.88 0.00 
IT 29.54 29.54 0.00 29.54 29.54 0.00 
LT 9.21 9.21 0.00 9.21 9.21 0.00 
LU 23.13 24.64 1.52 23.13 24.64 1.52 
LV 8.56 9.31 0.75 8.56 8.56 0.00 
MT 27.31 29.06 1.75 27.31 29.06 1.75 
NL 27.95 29.67 1.73 27.95 29.67 1.73 
PL 13.10 14.05 0.95 13.10 14.05 0.95 
PT 21.11 22.49 1.38 21.11 22.49 1.38 
SE 18.20 19.48 1.28 18.20 18.20 0.00 
SI 18.21 19.46 1.25 19.46 19.46 0.00 
SK 13.17 13.17 0.00 13.17 13.17 0.00 
UK 22.71 24.21 1.50 22.71 22.71 0.00 
EU-24 average 21.04 21.90 0.86 21.09 21.65 0.56 
Standard  
deviation 
8.02 8.30 0.76 8.00 8.34 0.78 
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On average, hence, although the Marks & Spencer case and Member States’ adjustments to 
their rules on intra-group loss compensation contribute to aligning domestic and cross-border 
investments from the perspective of single Member States, no full equality is reached and some 
obstacles to cross-border business activity remain. Besides, whereas the standard deviation of 
domestic EATR slightly decreases following the adjustments to the Marks & Spencer judge-
ment (from 8.02 to 8.00), it slightly increases for the cross-border case (from 8.30 to 8.34) 
which indicates that the spread in cross-border tax burdens upon subsidiary losses increases 
among Member States. As such, the contribution of the Marks & Spencer case and Member 
States’ related tax law adjustments towards the establishment of an internal market seems – if 
at all – rather modest. 
6. Controlled Foreign Company Rules and the “Cadbury Schweppes” Case 
6.1. Case setting and preliminary remarks 
The ”Cadbury Schweppes“ case (C-196/04)87 challenged the conformity of the United King-
dom’s CFC rules against the background of EU law. Despite the general tax exemption of a 
foreign subsidiary’s profits in the United Kingdom, the profits of a CFC (participation > 50%) 
might be taxed in the United Kingdom provided that the CFC is subject to low taxation in the 
sense that its tax liability does not exceed a threshold of three quarters of the liability that would 
have resulted under the rules applicable in the United Kingdom.88 In the case at hand, United 
Kingdom resident parent company Cadbury Schweppes plc had, among others, two Irish sub-
sidiaries held as financing companies that were subject to a tax rate of 10% which triggered the 
application of CFC rules.89 The ECJ held such a rule incompatible with the freedom of estab-
lishment (Art. 43 EC/Art. 49 TFEU) in its judgement of 12 September 2006 and required its 
scope to be restricted to wholly artificial arrangements without economic substance.90 As CFC 
rules seem to play an important role in corporate investment decisions,91 a restriction of such 
rules to third country relationships might enhance intra-EU tax competition.92 
To analyse the impact of the Cadbury Schweppes case on investment conditions among Mem-
ber States, we follow the general approach of Bräutigam et al. (2017) and assume that a parent 
                                                 
87 ECJ, 12 September 2006, Case C-196/04, Cadbury Schweppes plc, Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd v Com-
missioners of Inland Revenue. 
88 See Cadbury Schweppes (C-196/04), para. 3-12 for a detailed overview on the underlying legislation. 
89 See Cadbury Schweppes (C-196/04), para. 13-28 for the case setting and prior legal procedure. 
90 See Cadbury Schweppes (C-196/04), para. 75. For a detailed description and discussion of the case, see, for 
instance Meussen (2007). 
91 See, for instance, references to Ruf/Weichenrieder (2012) and Ruf/Weichenrieder (2013) in 
Bräutigam et al. (2017), pp. 721 f. 
92 See Bräutigam et al. (2017), p. 722. 
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corporation situated in one Member State invests into a subsidiary located in any other Member 
State. In terms of a comprehensive analysis, we assume a weighted investment across all five 
kinds of assets instead of the mere acquisition of a patent. Furthermore, we assume that all other 
prerequisites for the applicability of CFC rules are fulfilled and hence only the low taxation 
criterion is decisive. 
The outbound investment under consideration bears a tax burden of 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟. CFC 
rules apply if this tax burden falls short of a threshold specified by the CFC rules of the parent’s 
residence country. In this case, the cross-border investment is taxed as if it was a domestic 
investment in the residence state of the parent company. Hence, the EATR for a cross-border 
investment under the application of CFC rules equals at least the EATR for a domestic invest-
ment in the parent company’s residence state. In contrast, if the outbound investment’s tax bur-
den exceeds the CFC threshold established by the parent’s residence country, the outbound 
investment under consideration bears a tax burden of 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟. In Appendix A.2.3., 
we provide a detailed description of the amendments to the basic formulas of the Deve-
reux/Griffith model. 
We benchmark the outcomes of the cross-border investment (including CFC rules) against the 
case of a domestic investment in the residence state of the parent. All calculations are based on 
2005 tax data. 
6.2. Member States’ tax law adjustments in the context of the case 
In Table 5, we illustrate the general availability and scope of CFC rules before and after the 
Cadbury Schweppes case across Member States.  
Although the tax laws of eleven Member States included a CFC rule, it did not apply in relation 
to EU or EEA Member States already prior to the judgement in five countries.93 In the context 
of the ECJ’s ruling in the Cadbury Schweppes case, five countries amended their CFC rules by 
an EU/EEA clause to limit the applicability of CFC rules to third countries. The scope of the 
exemption went even further in Hungary by likewise including third countries that have con-
cluded a tax treaty with Hungary. By contrast, Denmark is the only Member State that extended 
the scope of its CFC rules and implemented a modified CFC regime that covers both Danish 
and foreign entities. Under the new system, among others, CFC rules apply if more than half of 
                                                 
93 Under the Spanish and Swedish rules, certain types of income arising in Member States such as Luxembourg, 
Belgium or Cyprus constituted taxable CFC income. However, as this covers very specific types of income, 
we assume a general non-applicability of CFC rules in relation to those Member States, respectively. 
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the income of a subsidiary constitutes CFC income including capital income (interest, divi-
dends, and capital gains) rather than upon a general low level of taxation.94 As such, Member 
States’ adjusted CFC rules comply with the enhanced intra-EU requirements for CFC rules 
following the Cadbury Schweppes ruling. 
Table 5: Member States' adjustments following the Cadbury Schweppes case 
  
Availability and scope of CFC rules 
Pre-Cadbury Schweppes Post-Cadbury Schweppes 
CFC rule? EU/EEA exclusion? CFC rule? EU/EEA exclusion? 
AT - - - - 
BE - - - - 
CY - - - - 
CZ - - - - 
DE x - x x 
DK x - x - 
EE - - - - 
EL - - - - 
ES x x x x 
FI x - x x 
FR x x x x 
HU x - x x 
IE - - - - 
IT x x x x 
LT x x x x 
LU - - - - 
LV - - - - 
MT - - - - 
NL - - - - 
PL - - - - 
PT x - x x 
SE x x x x 
SI - - - - 
SK - - - - 
UK x - x x 
x = CFC rule / exclusion available 
- = CFC rule / exclusion not available 
The highlighted characteristics represent changes to the domestic rules that occur in the context of the 
Cadbury Schweppes case. 
6.3. Implications of the “Cadbury Schweppes” case for the realisation of the internal 
market 
As a benchmark, the first column in Table 6 illustrates the EATR for domestic investments. 
The unweighted average EATR for the EU-25 Member States amounts to 27.36% whereas the 
standard deviation of 8.23 indicates a considerable spread in domestic EATR that vary between 
                                                 
94 See Koerver Schmidt (2013), pp. 266-274 for a detailed description of the amended Danish CFC legislation. 
For an analysis of the new Danish CFC rules in light of EU law, see Koerver Schmidt (2013), pp. 276 f. and 
Koerver Schmidt (2014). 
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11.93% in Cyprus and 40.77% in Spain. For cross-border investments (columns 2 to 4), we 
illustrate the lowest and highest EATR before and after the Cadbury Schweppes judgement 
including the potential applicability of CFC rules.95 
In general, the lowest possible cross-border EATR are lower than domestic EATR in all Mem-
ber States except Cyprus, Greece and Ireland even upon the potential application of CFC rules 
before the Cadbury Schweppes judgement (unweighted averages of 16.67% v 27.36%). This 
indicates a general preference for cross-border investment. Although it is lower than in the do-
mestic case, there is a considerable spread in cross-border EATR across Member States which 
is illustrated by the standard deviation of 7.42; the lowest possible cross-border EATR vary 
between 11.93% (Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, Slovenia, Slovak Republic) and 32.08% (Greece). 
Potential changes to cross-border EATR will only result for Member States that apply CFC 
rules which were amended by an EU/EEA clause following the Cadbury Schweppes judgement 
(Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Portugal, and United Kingdom). From the perspective of a 
Finnish, German or Portuguese parent corporation, the amended CFC rules have widened in-
vestment choices and have further enhanced the attractiveness of cross-border investment. The 
decline in the lowest possible EATR is most pronounced in Germany (almost 13 percentage 
points) whereas it is of similar magnitude in Finland and Portugal (roughly 4 percentage points). 
The highest possible EATR do not change upon a potential non-applicability of CFC rules fol-
lowing the Cadbury Schweppes case. The strong decline in Germany traces back to the interplay 
between a comparatively high domestic tax level and a strict threshold for low taxation at 25% 
established in the CFC rules. As such, CFC rules apply in relation to CFCs resident in seven 
Member States (Cyprus, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovak Republic) 
before the amendment by an EU/EEA clause. For an outbound investment into a Cypriot sub-
sidiary, for instance, the associated gross-up to German domestic tax levels following the ap-
plicability of CFC rules would increase the EATR for cross-border investment by roughly 
26 percentage points (from 13.85% to 39.83%). Hence, upon the non-applicability of CFC rules 
in relation to low-taxed EU subsidiaries, the average EATR for outbound investments of a Ger-
man parent entity decreases quite considerably. The lowest possible EATR for cross-border 
                                                 
95 Other than Bräutigam et al. (2017) who depict unweighted average inbound and outbound EATR across all 
possible investment locations, we consider the lowest and highest possible outbound EATR for the respective 
residence country of the parent entity. As only a limited number of Member States applies CFC rules to intra-
EU investment prior to the Cadbury Schweppes case and most Member States exempt foreign dividend income, 
if any, we would observe only very small average effects following the limited applicability of CFC rules 
among Member States. At the same time, the causes of the changes would remain largely unknown. 
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investment can now be achieved upon an investment into a Cypriot subsidiary whereas the 
lowest possible EATR has resulted upon an investment into a subsidiary resident in Slovenia 
(at 26.77%) before the necessary amendments following the Cadbury Schweppes case were 
adopted.  
In Hungary, the threshold for low taxation of a foreign affiliate is at two thirds of the regular 
Hungarian corporate income tax rate of 16% (i.e. 10.67%). For such low threshold, CFC rules 
do not apply in relation to any other country in the case at hand. Hence, the amendment of 
Hungary’s CFC rules to exclude foreign entities resident in the EU, OECD or a country with 
which Hungary has concluded a tax treaty does not have any effect in our model calculations. 
Although the scope and applicability of CFC rules is limited in the United Kingdom following 
the Cadbury Schweppes judgement, the judgement does not seem to affect cross-border corpo-
rate investment choices and the lowest possible EATR remains available upon an investment 
into Luxembourg. This stems from the application of a credit system under which profit distri-
butions from foreign affiliates are subject to tax in the United Kingdom whereas credit relief is 
available for foreign taxes paid. As such, the credit system realises CEN and the EATR is 
largely determined by the domestic tax level. 
In contrast, the lowest possible EATR for Danish cross-border investment increases by 
3.40 percentage points upon the amendments following the Cadbury Schweppes judgement: As 
illustrated in Section 6.2., Denmark has subsequently adopted an extended CFC regime that 
applies group taxation rules to both domestic and foreign entities. By assumption, this would 
establish a minimum EATR level of 28.50% and hence lead to an overall increase in the average 
outbound EATR for Danish parent corporations. In line with the increase in the lowest possible 
EATR level, CEN is established in relation to the majority of Member States. 
As such, EATR levels in Finland, Germany and Portugal are adjusted to Member States where 
no CFC legislation applies and low cross-border tax levels could be achieved irrespective of 
the Cadbury Schweppes case. Under 100% equity financing, the EATR for cross-border invest-
ment corresponds to the EATR for domestic investment in the residence country of the subsid-
iary if the residence country of the parent applies the exemption method for foreign dividends 
(CIN). Nevertheless, differences in cross-border tax burdens persist for Member States such as 
France, Germany or Italy where the exemption is limited to 95% of the received dividends. 
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Besides, (cross-border) investment into Cyprus96 is not the universal preferred investment op-
tion across all Member States: For corporations situated in Malta and the United Kingdom, 
investing into a subsidiary located in Belgium (Maltese parent) or Luxembourg (United King-
dom parent) yields the lowest tax burden whereas Greek and Irish parent entities would prefer 
domestic investment due to the application of a credit system. As evident from the case of a 
parent entity situated in the United Kingdom, these preferences persist irrespective of the ap-
plication of CFC rules. For a parent corporation situated in Denmark, both domestic as well as 
cross-border investment into 14 other countries would yield the same (lowest) EATR. Overall, 
the spread in lowest cross-border EATR measured by the standard deviation slightly increases 
(from 7.42 to 7.44) following Member States adjustments to the Cadbury Schweppes case. 
Overall, although the ECJ’s decision in the Cadbury Schweppes case has contributed to pro-
moting cross-border business activities among Member States and to the establishment of a 
European internal market from the perspective of single Member States, its impact seems to be 
of limited scope: On the one hand, CFC rules were applicable in relation to related entities 
resident in other Member States only in a small number of countries before the ECJ rendered 
its decision in the Cadbury Schweppes case. On the other hand, differences in cross-border 
EATR persist due to the application of different methods for avoidance of double taxation of 
dividends (credit v exemption) as well as due to different levels of dividend exemption even if 
CFC rules cease to be applicable in relation to EU affiliates. Besides, from the perspective of 
Danish corporations, cross-border investment choices are limited upon the wider scope of CFC 
rules following the Cadbury Schweppes case. 
Upon the mandatory application of the ATAD as of 1 January 2019, all Member States have 
been obliged to implement CFC rules in line with the minimum standards established by Arti-
cles 7/8 ATAD. This has induced a need for adjustment in roughly half of the Member States.97 
In line with the Cadbury Schweppes doctrine, Article 7 (2) a) ATAD nevertheless limits the 
applicability of CFC rules to wholly artificial arrangements within the EU.98 As such, the im-
plementation of the CFC rules established by the ATAD will presumably not affect corporate 
investment choices. 
  
                                                 
96 As evident from Table 6, a Cypriot parent entity would prefer domestic to cross-border investment. 
97 See Gutmann et al. (2017), pp. 12-16 for an analysis of Member States CFC rules against the standard estab-
lished by Articles 7/8 ATAD. 
98 See also Schönfeld (2017), p. 146; Dehne (2018), pp. 134 f. 
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Table 6: Cross-border EATR before and after the Cadbury Schweppes case (2006) 
  
Domestic  
tax burden [%] 
Lowest cross-border 
 effective tax burden [%] 
Highest cross- 
border effective 
tax burden [%] 
Pre-Cadbury  
Schweppes 
Post-Cadbury  
Schweppes 
AT 26.03 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
       
 
BE 33.67 
13.59 13.59 41.94 
CY CY ES 
       
 
CY 11.93 
14.56 14.56 40.77 
LT LT ES 
       
 
CZ 25.91 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
       
 
DE 39.83 
26.77 13.85 42.13 
SI CY ES 
        
DK 28.50 
25.10 28.50 40.77 
SI All countries ex. BE, DE, EL, 
ES, FR, IT, LU, MT, NL, UK 
ES 
        
EE 26.35 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
        
EL 31.70 
32.08 32.08 40.77 
LU LU ES 
        
ES 40.77 
11.93 11.93 39.83 
CY CY DE 
        
FI 27.65 
16.10 11.93 40.77 
LV CY ES 
        
FR 39.07 
13.63 13.63 41.97 
CY CY ES 
        
HU 18.58 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
        
IE 16.17 
25.10 25.10 40.77 
SI SI ES 
        
IT 35.80 
13.54 13.54 41.01 
CY CY ES 
        
LT 14.56 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
        
LU 30.22 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
        
LV 16.10 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
        
MT 36.51 
34.83 34.83 40.77 
BE BE ES 
        
NL 32.22 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
        
PL 19.40 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
        
PT 27.91 
16.10 11.93 40.77 
LV CY ES 
        
SE 27.96 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
        
SI 25.10 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
        
SK 19.13 
11.93 11.93 40.77 
CY CY ES 
        
UK 32.99 
30.22 30.22 40.77 
LU LU ES 
        
EU-25 average 27.36 16.67 15.95 40.89 
Standard  
deviation 
8.23 7.42 7.44 0.47 
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7. Exit Taxation and the “National Grid Indus” Case 
7.1. Case setting and preliminary remarks 
In the “National Grid Indus” case (C-371/10)99 on corporate exit taxation rules, Dutch limited 
liability corporation National Grid Indus BV had a claim against National Grid Company plc 
established in the United Kingdom which carried an unrealised exchange rate gain.100 By virtue 
of the double taxation convention between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, National 
Grid Indus BV was no longer liable to tax in the Netherlands upon the transfer of its place of 
effective management to the United Kingdom. As such, the Dutch tax authorities wanted to tax 
the unrealised exchange rate gain. In its ruling of 29 November 2011, the ECJ held that exit tax 
was in principle chargeable on an unrealised capital gain upon the transfer of a company’s place 
of effective management to another Member State. It further held, however, that the immediate 
recovery of such unrealised capital gain would infringe the freedom of establishment (Arti-
cle 49 TFEU).101 The judgement in the National Grid Indus case constitutes a landmark decision 
as it is the first precedent in the second phase of case law on exit taxes:102 During the first phase, 
the ECJ dealt with exit taxes imposed upon the expatriation of individuals to another Member 
State (e.g. the “Lasteyrie du Saillant” and “N” cases)103 and found that exit taxes might repre-
sent an unjustified restriction to the freedom of establishment. During the second phase of case 
law where the scope was extended to corporations, the ECJ held that such restriction might be 
justified and proportionate upon a staggered recovery of the resulting exit tax liability. In this 
context, Schön (2015) also notes a change in the ECJ’s perception of the internal market: 
Whereas prior jurisprudence had rather emphasised the concept of a single market without any 
internal borders, the ECJ seemed to recognise the legitimacy of such borders upon the decision 
in the National Grid Indus case.104 
If an entity transfers its legal seat or place of effective management abroad, exit taxes usually 
apply on the unrealised capital gains that have accrued in its assets (defined as fair value – tax 
book value of assets). To illustrate the effects of such a transfer within the framework of the 
Devereux/Griffith model, we assume that the transferring firm only owns a self-created patent 
                                                 
99 ECJ, 29 November 2011, Case C-371/10, National Grid Indus BV v Inspecteur van de Belastingdienst 
Rijnmond / kantoor Rotterdam. 
100 See National Grid Indus (C-371/10), para. 10-21 for the case setting and prior legal procedure. The underlying 
legal context is described in para. 3-9. 
101 See National Grid Indus (C-371/10), para. 86. 
102 See Koury (2018), pp. 507 f. for the following reasoning on the two phases in case law on exit taxation. 
103 ECJ, 11 March 2004, Case C-9/02, Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant and Ministère de l’Économie, des Finances 
et de l’Industrie and ECJ, 7 September 2006, Case C-470/04, N v Insecteur van de Belastingdienst Oost/kantoor 
Almelo. 
104 See Schön (2015), pp. 282 f. 
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(equity-financed). Building on the approach of Evers and Spengel (2014), we consider that the 
patent is subsequently transferred to a foreign subsidiary in order to evaluate the impact of the 
National Grid Indus case on Member States’ exit taxation regimes. The consideration of such 
transfer and potential associated exit taxes requires several modifications to the baseline for-
mulas of the Devereux/Griffith model as further described in Appendix A.2.4. 
In the majority of Member States, self-developed patents cannot be capitalised for tax purposes 
and hence have a book value of zero.105 R&D costs are expensed immediately and shield part 
of the return from taxation at the level of the parent entity.106 Upon transfer of the patent to a 
foreign subsidiary, the domestic parent might be subject to exit taxes on the underlying transfer 
price that – by assumption – corresponds to the earnings value of the patent.107 Subsequently, 
the recipient subsidiary capitalises and depreciates the patent. Furthermore, the return from the 
exploitation of the patent is subject to tax under the rules of the Member State where the recip-
ient resides.  
If the tax code of the transferring parent entity’s residence country stipulates to capitalise the 
patent, exit tax applies on the difference between the transfer price and the book value which 
corresponds to the costs of creating the patent. To ensure consistency, we additionally account 
for a “step-up” in the value of the patent to the earnings value (i.e. the transfer price) in case the 
transferring entity is subject to exit taxes in its residence state. If the Member State where the 
transferring entity is resident does not impose exit taxes, no step-up is available and the recipient 
entity capitalises the patent based on its costs. 
If a staggered recovery of exit taxes in the residence country of the parent entity over a pre-
defined period is available, we do not account for accrued interest upon deferral. In case na-
tional rules allow for deferral until the asset is effectively transferred to a third party such as for 
instance in Spain, we assume that this deferral is effective within ten years following the trans-
fer.  
Based on the (admittedly strong) assumption of a mere tax-motivated transfer of the asset, we 
exemplify the impact of the National Grid Indus case based on the transfer of a self-developed 
                                                 
105 In Cyprus, Portugal and Sweden, however, the capitalisation of self-developed patents is mandatory. In Slove-
nia, research costs cannot be capitalised whereas domestic law stipulates the capitalisation of development 
costs. Yet, we assume that there is no capitalisation of the patent in Slovenia and all related costs are immedi-
ately expensed for the quantitative analysis in Section 7.3. 
106 See Evers/Spengel (2014), p. 6; Evers et al. (2015), pp. 511 f.; Evers (2015), pp. 96 f. 
107 See Evers/Spengel (2014), pp. 14-16; Evers (2015), pp. 128 f. 
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patent to Bulgaria as a low-tax country.108 As a benchmark, we compare the cross-border trans-
fer to the case where the patent is created and exploited in the home country of the parent. All 
calculations are based on 2010 tax data. 
7.2. Member States’ tax law adjustments in the context of the case 
In Table 7 we summarise the availability and design of exit taxes before and after the ruling in 
the National Grid Indus case.  
Table 7: Member States' adjustments following the National Grid Indus case 
  
Availability and design of exit taxes 
Pre-National Grid Indus Post-National Grid Indus 
Exit Tax? Deferral? Exit Tax? Deferral? 
AT - - - - 
BE x - x x 
BG x - x - 
CY - - - - 
CZ - - - - 
DE x x x x 
DK x - x x 
EL x - x - 
ES x - x x 
FI x - x - 
FR x - x x 
HU x - x - 
IE x - x x 
IT x - x x 
LT x - x - 
LU x - x x 
LV x - x - 
MT - - - - 
NL x - x x 
PL x - x - 
PT x - x x 
RO - - - - 
SE x - x - 
SI - - - - 
SK - - - - 
UK x - x x 
x = Exit tax / deferral available 
- = Exit tax / deferral not available 
The highlighted characteristics represent changes to the domestic rules that 
occur in the context of the National Grid Indus case. 
Although the tax laws of 19 out of the 26 Member States included an exit taxation rule, only 
Germany deferred the recovery of exit taxes before the decision in the National Grid Indus case 
                                                 
108 If the transferring entity itself is resident in Bulgaria, we consider a transfer to Cyprus. Although the tax rate is 
the same in Bulgaria and Cyprus, we choose Bulgaria as potential recipient country due to its slightly more tax 
favourable depreciation rules for patents.  
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had been rendered. In subsequent years, ten Member States implemented the possibility to defer 
the payment of exit taxes whereas eight Member States maintained their prior exit tax rules that 
seemingly discriminated against cross-border transfers. Deferral periods range from five years 
in Belgium, France or Portugal up to ten years for instance in the Netherlands or United King-
dom. Spain and Luxembourg recover exit taxes upon the termination of the ownership of the 
asset. 
7.3. Implications of the “National Grid Indus” case for the realisation of the internal 
market 
In Table 8, we illustrate the EATR for the cross-border transfer of a patent to a low-taxed sub-
sidiary situated in Bulgaria (Cyprus) before and after the ECJ’s ruling in the National Grid 
Indus case, respectively. As a benchmark, the table also includes the EATR for the domestic 
case where the patent is developed and exploited in the home country of the parent entity. 
If the parent entity develops and subsequently uses the patent in its residence country, the (un-
weighted) average EATR is equal to 18.41%. Among Member States, there is a considerable 
spread in EATR with the lowest EATR at 7.50% in Bulgaria and the highest EATR at 30.63% 
in Portugal. Apart from the underlying statutory corporate income tax rates, the EATR is driven 
by the potential capitalisation of R&D costs and – if the patent must be capitalised – the appli-
cable depreciation methods and rates in the domestic case. Upon capitalisation, there is no im-
mediate tax effect from the creation of the patent in terms of tax-deductible R&D costs. Rather, 
the relief is spread over the specified depreciation period. 
Upon transfer of the patent to a low-tax subsidiary resident in Bulgaria (Cyprus), the (un-
weighted) average EATR across Member States amounts to 13.44% before the ruling in the 
National Grid Indus case and to 7.62% after several Member States have adjusted their exit tax 
regimes by a deferral rule in response to the National Grid Indus case. Already before the ruling, 
the transfer to a low-tax subsidiary is preferred to the domestic exploitation if the transfer results 
in a lower EATR. Except for Belgium and Germany, this holds true for Member States that 
either stipulate the capitalisation of self-developed IP (Cyprus, Portugal, Sweden) and/or do not 
impose any exit taxes (Austria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Malta, Romania, Slovenia, Slovak 
Republic). In contrast to other Member States, a deferral of the exit tax liability was available 
in Germany prior to the decision in the National Grid Indus case. The advantage from a lower 
taxation of current returns from the patent in the low-tax country seems to overcompensate the 
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disadvantage from the immediate exit tax liability upon transfer in Belgium, Portugal and Swe-
den. As such, the transfer is preferred despite the immediate application of exit taxes. 
Table 8: EATR upon transfer of patent to low-tax subsidiary before and after the National 
Grid Indus case (2010) 
EATR 
Domestic  
investment 
[%] 
Transfer to low-tax subsidiary (Bulgaria) 
Pre-National 
Grid Indus 
[%] 
Post-National 
Grid Indus 
[%] 
Change  
[percentage 
points] 
Post-case  
difference to 
domestic  
investment  
[percentage 
points] 
AT 18.75 -15.65 -15.65 0.00 -34.40 
BE 25.49 25.28 15.32 -9.96 -10.17 
BG 7.50 12.82 12.82 0.00 5.32 
CY 10.56 9.79 9.79 0.00 -0.78 
CZ 14.25 -9.55 -9.55 0.00 -23.80 
DE 23.21 18.11 18.11 0.00 -5.10 
DK 18.75 22.72 13.11 -9.61 -5.64 
EL 18.00 21.97 21.97 0.00 3.97 
ES 26.80 30.77 0.06 -30.72 -26.75 
FI 19.50 23.47 23.47 0.00 3.97 
FR 26.57 30.54 20.16 -10.38 -6.41 
HU 15.65 19.62 19.62 0.00 3.97 
IE 9.38 13.35 9.10 -4.25 -0.28 
IT 23.48 27.45 11.57 -15.87 -11.90 
LT 11.25 15.22 15.22 0.00 3.97 
LU 21.44 25.41 0.84 -24.57 -20.60 
LV 11.25 15.22 15.22 0.00 3.97 
MT 26.25 -25.83 -25.83 0.00 -52.08 
NL 19.13 23.10 10.16 -12.93 -8.96 
PL 14.25 18.22 18.22 0.00 3.97 
PT 30.63 25.72 7.11 -18.61 -23.51 
RO 12.00 -6.49 -6.49 0.00 -18.49 
SE 24.26 23.23 23.23 0.00 -1.03 
SI 15.00 -10.56 -10.56 0.00 -25.56 
SK 14.25 -9.55 -9.55 0.00 -23.80 
UK 21.00 24.97 10.77 -14.20 -10.23 
EU-26 
average 
18.41 13.44 7.62 -5.81 -10.78 
Standard  
deviation 
6.25 15.91 13.23 8.84 14.62 
The negative EATR in Member States without exit taxes (except Cyprus) is striking. It traces 
back to the immediate tax-effective deductibility of R&D costs in the residence country of the 
parent, the tax-free transfer and subsequent exploitation of the patent in a low-tax Member 
State. By contrast, Cyprus stipulates the capitalisation of the self-developed patent. Although 
the parent is not liable to exit taxes, the subsequent taxation of the proceeds from the patent in 
Bulgaria is comparable to the case of domestic taxation which maintains a positive EATR. 
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In all ten Member States where the option to defer the exit tax liability was introduced following 
the National Grid Indus judgement, the transfer of the patent to a subsidiary resident in Bulgaria 
becomes advantageous compared to the domestic exploitation or the preference is reinforced, 
respectively. The length of the deferral period is seemingly not decisive. In Luxembourg and 
Spain, however, the decrease in EATR is especially pronounced following the adjustments to 
the National Grid Indus judgement. Both countries allow to defer the tax payment until the 
actual termination of the ownership of the underlying asset. In our calculations, we assume that 
the Bulgarian subsidiary sells the patent to a third party within ten years after it has received 
the patent from the Luxembourgian/Spanish parent. Therefore, both the recovery of the exit tax 
liability after ten years and the taxation of the proceeds from the exploitation of the patent at a 
considerably lower statutory rate in Bulgaria lead to a very low overall EATR. As a whole, both 
the average EATR and standard deviation upon transfer decrease because of Member States’ 
adjustments to the National Grid Indus case. In consequence, the transfer of a self-created patent 
to a low-tax Member State is preferred to domestic exploitation for 19 Member States. 
Overall, the National Grid Indus case and the subsequent availability of a deferred recovery of 
exit taxes in several Member States remarkably enhances the tax favourability of transferring a 
self-developed patent into a foreign (EU) subsidiary. As such, the judgement has contributed to 
eliminating tax obstacles to cross-border reorganisations from the perspective of single Member 
States. However, as six Member States have not adjusted their exit taxation rules by including 
a deferral option in the context of the National Grid Indus case, it is not possible to remove such 
obstacles completely across the EU. Besides, a considerable spread in cross-country EATR 
persists that more than doubles the spread in EATR for domestic investment (13.23 v 6.25) due 
to country-specific upstream differences regarding the capitalisation of self-developed intangi-
ble assets or general availability of exit taxes. 
According to Article 5 ATAD, Member States must provide for an exit taxation rule upon trans-
fers of assets/residence to another EU Member State that allows taxpayers to settle the resulting 
exit tax liability in five annual instalments by 31 December 2019 (Art. 11 (5) ATAD). Although 
Member States may implement or maintain even stricter rules, they are bound by the “minimum 
level of protection” (Art. 3) established by the ATAD. Hence, countries with more generous 
current exit taxation rules where staggered payments are possible over a period of more than 
five years would have to limit the available deferral period.109 Drawing from our findings in the 
                                                 
109 Since Article 5 should reflect the standards on exit taxation established by ECJ case law, stricter national rules 
in the sense of a shorter deferral period risk being challenged on their conformity with EU law. See Peeters 
(2017), pp. 123 f. with reference to DG TAXUD (2016). 
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above analysis of the implications of the National Grid Indus case, the length of the available 
deferral period was not decisive regarding the general attractiveness of the transfer of assets/res-
idence to a low-tax Member State. However, depending on potential interrelations between the 
tax levels in the residence country of the transferring parent and a shortened deferral period, a 
limitation of the deferral period to five years might have negative repercussions for corporate 
relocation decisions. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have analysed the effects of four landmark rulings of the ECJ on corporate 
investment conditions including their impact towards the objective of realising an internal mar-
ket based on effective tax levels (EATR) according to the Devereux/Griffith methodology. Fol-
lowing Member States’ tax law amendments in the context of the Lankhorst-Hohorst and Cad-
bury Schweppes judgements, the treatment of domestic and cross-border investment is aligned 
on country level, respectively. Upon Member States’ maintenance of discriminatory regulations 
following the Marks & Spencer and National Grid Indus cases, by contrast, it is not possible to 
fully avoid discrimination of cross-border investment in line with the mandate of the ECJ. Be-
yond the ECJ’s mandate and self-imposed goals,110 we find that Member States’ heterogeneous 
adjustments, varying levels of compliance, differences in the general availability of rules com-
parable to the rule under scrutiny in a particular case as well as the impact of other national 
rules that remain unaffected by the judgement contribute to persistently high spreads in EATR 
across Member States. As such, corporate investment decisions continue to be distorted across 
countries which obstructs the realisation of a European internal market.  
Overall, our findings seem to confirm the results of prior economic studies that cast doubts on 
the advantageous effects of ECJ case law on investment conditions in Member States.111 The 
causes that have been suggested for this overall effect are manifold: As such, it stands to reason 
that although tax discriminations might be avoided on country level, it is difficult to eliminate 
cross-country distortions and disparities upon Member States’ un-coordinated tax law adjust-
ments following a particular judgement.112 Hence, tax neutrality in terms of CEN or CIN goes 
beyond a mere avoidance of discrimination between domestic and cross-border investments.113 
                                                 
110 Although the ECJ seeks to eliminate rules that result in discrimination of cross-border investment, it does 
neither attempt to establish “full cross-border tax neutrality within the Internal Market“ nor does it consider 
the general existence of differences in Member States‘ legal systems to violate EU law as such. See 
Schön (2015), p. 276 including further references. 
111 See de la Feria/Fuest (2016), p. 71; Bräutigam et al. (2017), pp. 741 f. 
112 See de la Feria/Fuest (2016), pp. 65-67 with further references. 
113 See Spengel (2003), p. 257 who illustrates the relationship between tax neutrality concepts (CIN/CEN) and the 
non-discrimination principle. 
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The uniform and homogeneous application of case law across Member States, however, is con-
tingent on several factors such as “the clarity and consistency of the ECJ’s judg[e]ments”, “the 
ability of national courts to adopt and interpret” as well as “the willingness of national legisla-
tures to adapt to, and comply with” ECJ case law.114 Based on the finding that ECJ case law 
does not necessarily contribute to establishing an internal market, de la Feria and Fuest (2016) 
even question the legitimacy of the Court’s role in this regard.115 
Besides, upon the transposition of case law into domestic law, Member States only selectively 
adjust single rules against the background of their own tax and legal systems.116 Apart from 
being outside the scope of the Court’s mandate, the consequences of an isolated negative inte-
gration of single and in part specific rules would always fall short of the effect of full harmoni-
sation by way of positive integration.117 Such – if at all partial – harmonisation following from 
negative integration has further important repercussions on tax competition among Member 
States: In case only specific parts of European tax systems are streamlined whereas differences 
in other elements such as tax rates or tax bases persist, these differences subsequently become 
more important for investment decisions.118 Genschel et al. (2011) point to the ambiguous ef-
fects of ECJ case law on intra-EU tax competition: According to the authors, tax competition 
would diminish if a judgement was mainly influenced by national public interest whereas tax 
competition would increase upon an enhanced focus on taxpayers’ free movement rights.119 
Our quantitative findings lend support to this conclusion: The Lankhorst-Hohorst case, for in-
stance, has generally facilitated cross-border (intra-group) lending. In consequence, however, 
tax rate competition might also intensify as lowering the overall tax burden by lending from a 
foreign affiliate resident in a low-tax Member State becomes a viable strategy. 
To conclude, ECJ case law and Member States’ associated leeway for transposing the require-
ments into their domestic tax laws do not seem to be an adequate instrument for eliminating tax 
distortions among Member States towards the realisation of an internal market, but rather only 
contributes to eliminating tax discriminations on country level. Besides, ECJ case law does not 
induce an obligation for Member States to introduce comparable (compliant) rules if such pro-
                                                 
114 See Panayi (2010), p. 268 as well as – for a more detailed reasoning – pp. 297-300. 
115 See de la Feria/Fuest (2016), p. 71. However, similar to the present study that analyses a small selection of 
landmark rulings, de la Feria/Fuest also point out that one cannot come to a reasonable general conclusion on 
the effects of ECJ case law based on the analysis of a single ruling. 
116 See Everett (2006), p. 358. 
117 See Everett (2006), p. 368. 
118 See de la Feria/Fuest (2016), p. 71. 
119 See Genschel et al. (2011), p. 589. 
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visions are previously unknown to the domestic tax system. To sustainably eliminate competi-
tive distortions to investment among Member States, a comprehensive and mandatory harmo-
nisation of direct tax systems by way of positive integration seems necessary, for instance 
through the introduction of a C(C)CTB.120  
Our analysis further reveals that the effect of selective anti-abuse rules as included in the ATAD 
which intend to make national tax systems more resilient against tax planning strategies of mul-
tinational firms might be twofold: On the one hand, harmonised interest deduction limitation 
rules might lead to an overall increase in EATR which could compromise the location attrac-
tiveness of the EU as a whole. On the other hand, the harmonised and mandatory implementa-
tion of anti-abuse rules across Member States might likewise contribute to reducing the spread 
in EATR across Member States, for instance regarding cross-border asset relocations, and hence 
contribute to establishing more neutrality within the internal market.
                                                 
120 See Spengel (2007), p. 119; Spengel (2008), pp. 28-30; Spengel/Stutzenberger (2018), pp. 39 f. for the elimi-
nation of tax obstacles upon different degrees of tax harmonisation in the EU. 
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Appendix 
A.1. The basic formulas of the Devereux/Griffith model 
The EATR is used as a measure to estimate the impact of ECJ case law on investment location 
decisions and its contribution towards the establishment of an internal market. It is computed 
as the difference of net present value (NPV) before and after taxes (denoted by 𝑅∗ and 𝑅), 
divided by the discounted pre-tax rate of return 𝑝: 
(1) 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅 =
𝑅∗−𝑅
𝑝 (1+𝑟)⁄
  with 
(2) 𝑅∗ =
𝑝−𝑟
1+𝑟
  and 
(3) 𝑅 = −𝛾 ∗ (1 − 𝐴 + 𝑒) +
𝛾
1+𝜌
∗ [(𝑝 + 𝛿) ∗ (1 + 𝜋) ∗ (1 − 𝜏) + (1 − 𝛿) ∗ (1 + 𝜋) ∗
(1 − 𝐴)].121 
For financing possibilities other than retained earnings, 𝑅 must be modified by an additional 
financing term 𝐹 as established in Table A1:122 
Table A1: Financing terms in the Devereux/Griffith model 
Retained earnings (RE) (4) 𝐹𝑅𝐸 = 0 
New equity (NE) (5) 𝐹𝑁𝐸 = −
𝜌∗(1−𝛾)∗(1+𝑒)
1+𝜌
 
Debt (D) (6) 𝐹𝐷 =
𝛾∗(1+𝑒)∗(𝜌−𝑖∗(1−𝛽∗𝜏))
1+𝜌
123 
In the absence of personal taxes, the shareholder’s nominal discount rate 𝜌 equals the nominal 
interest rate 𝑖. Otherwise, it is defined as:  
(7) 𝜌 = (
1−𝑚𝑖
1−𝑧
) ∗ 𝑖.124 
                                                 
121 The term 𝑒 has been included in the standard formulas to account for non-profit taxes such as real estate or net 
wealth taxes.  is the effective corporate income tax rate whereas 𝐴 reflects the present value of depreciation 
allowances according to national tax laws, 𝛿 accounts for the true economic depreciation rate and 𝛾 denotes 
the tax discrimination between new equity and profit distributions. 𝜋 reflects the inflation rate. 
122 Further modification is necessary if a Member State offers a notional interest deduction (NID), see Evers 
(2015), pp. 98 f.; ZEW (2018), p. B-26. 
123 𝛽 represents the fraction of tax-deductible interest at corporate level. 
124 See ZEW (2018), p. B-2. 𝑚𝑖 describes the taxation of interest income at shareholder level whereas 𝑧 is the 
effective capital gains tax.  
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The investment and financing structure of the domestic model is illustrated in Figure A1. 
Figure A1: Structure of domestic investment 
 
Apart from country-specific information on the type of tax system, types of applicable taxes 
(profit/non-profit), tax bases and tax rates on company and investor level,125 the model rests on 
certain economic assumptions set out in Table A2. 
Table A2: Economic assumptions of the Devereux/Griffith model 
Assumptions on types of taxes and tax bases 
Company level 
Corporate income tax including surcharges, local business taxes, non-
profit taxes 
Investor level Personal income tax, wealth tax, surcharges 
Tax base Depreciation, inventory valuation, deductibility of interest expenses 
Types of assets Intangibles, buildings, machinery, financial assets, inventory 
Assumptions on assets, financing and investors 
Financing Self-financing (retained earnings), new equity financing, debt financing 
Investors 
Top marginal statutory tax rate (qualified and non-qualified holding), zero 
tax rate 
Weights for assets, investors 
and financing 
- Assets: proportional (20% each) 
- Investors: proportional (33.33% each) 
- Financing: 55% self-financing, 10% new equity financing, 35% debt 
financing 
Assumptions on depreciation, inflation, interest rate and pre-tax rate of return 
Economic depreciation period 
Intangibles:  
12.5 years 
Buildings:  
53 years 
Machinery:  
11 years 
Inflation rate () 2% 
Real interest rate (𝑟) 5% 
Nominal interest rate (𝑖) 7.1% 
Pre-tax rate of return (𝑝) 20% 
Source: Spengel (2003), p. 88. 
 
                                                 
125 As indicated by the annual update on effective tax levels in the EU; see ZEW (2018). 
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To analyse cross-border investments, an extension of the baseline model framework is neces-
sary (see Figure A2).126 In the cross-border case, it is assumed that the investment is undertaken 
by a wholly owned foreign subsidiary which can be financed by retained earnings, new equity 
or debt. Whereas the asset structure and financing of the parent entity remain unchanged in 
relation to the domestic case, the different financing alternatives of the subsidiary are weighted 
proportionately (33.33% each). Furthermore, the calculations must consider the rules for for-
eign business activities applicable in the residence state of the parent company as well as rele-
vant provisions from bilateral double tax conventions, for instance regarding source taxes or 
the method for avoiding double taxation of capital income. 
Figure A2: Structure of cross-border investment 
 
A.2. Amendments of the basic formulas of the Devereux/Griffith model 
A.2.1. Amendments regarding the “Lankhorst-Hohorst” Case 
To quantify the impact of the Lankhorst-Hohorst case on effective tax rates of corporations 
located in different Member States within the Devereux/Griffith model, we follow the (slightly 
modified) approach of Spengel et al. (2016c) and consider a 100% debt-financed investment 
(corporate level only).127 In general, different approaches to limit the deductibility of interest 
expenses exist: Member States can either restrict interest deductibility with reference to a profit 
                                                 
126 For a detailed explanation of the extension and underlying formulas, see Devereux/Griffith (1999), pp. 24-30, 
40-46; Spengel (2003), pp. 134-138; Lammersen (2005), pp. 250-256. 
127 The lender itself is refinanced in line with the standard assumptions of the Devereux/Griffith methodology 
(55% retained earnings, 10% new equity, 35% debt). See also Spengel et al. (2016c), p. 29 for the following 
description of the methodology and underlying assumptions. 
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measure (so-called earnings-strippings rules), a fixed ratio of balance sheet positions (e.g. 
debt/equity or debt/assets) or based on the arm’s length approach. As the Devereux/Griffith 
model does not specify the characteristics of the underlying company in terms of balance sheet 
positions or profit measures and further assumes that a third party provides debt under arm’s 
length conditions, it is impossible to model specific characteristics of interest deduction limita-
tion rules or even rules that target only related party debt. Therefore, in case a Member State 
restricts the deductibility of domestic and/or cross-border interest payments by whichever rule, 
we assume that such rules fully inhibit interest deductibility and adjust 𝛽 in equation (6) ac-
cordingly (i.e. 𝛽 = 0). If full interest deductibility is available, in contrast, it holds that 
𝛽 = 1.128 
A.2.2. Amendments regarding the “Marks & Spencer” Case 
Devereux and Loretz (2008) have already introduced an international loss consolidation mech-
anism within the Devereux/Griffith framework.129 In line with the standard model, the authors 
assume that a parent company finances an investment of its wholly owned foreign subsidiary. 
They assign different probabilities to a “good” outcome where the subsidiary’s investment is 
profitable as well as to a “bad” outcome where investment yields a negative return to evaluate 
the implications of international loss consolidation and formulary apportionment for the effi-
ciency of the EU tax system. Against the background of a new subsidiary that does not have 
any retained or current profits, the loss of the subsidiary corresponds to the depreciation allow-
ance in period 𝑡. 
In contrast, we assume that the parent company splits its investment into a domestic investment 
in its residence state (weighted by 𝑤𝑝) and a cross-border investment through its foreign sub-
sidiary (weighted by 𝑤𝑠 with 𝑤𝑝 + 𝑤𝑠 = 1). The parent company’s domestic investment yields 
a positive pre-tax rate of return, depicted as 𝑝𝑝, whereas the return is negative for the subsidi-
ary’s investment (𝑙 < 0). By assumption, the subsidiary’s loss is equal to -5% whereas the in-
vestments of the parent and subsidiary are weighted by 80% and 20%, respectively. To keep 
the investments’ overall profitability 𝑝 constant at 20% in line with the general Devereux/Grif-
fith methodology, we adjust the pre-tax profitability of the parent’s domestic investment (𝑝𝑝) 
to 26.25%.  
                                                 
128 Other than Spengel et al. (2016c), we do not adjust 𝛽 further to reflect the value of an interest carry-forward 
since no country under consideration introduced such a provision as an immediate consequence of the Lank-
horst-Hohorst case. 
129 See Devereux/Loretz (2008), pp. 6-11. 
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It hence holds that:  
(8) 𝑝 = 𝑤𝑝 ∗ 𝑝𝑝 + 𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑙. 
It is further necessary to adjust both the pre-tax return 𝑅∗ and the return after taxes 𝑅 for cases 
with and without group-wide (international) loss consolidation. Under the split investment and 
in the presence of losses, we adjust the pre-tax return to: 
(9) 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡
∗ =  
(𝑤𝑝∗𝑝𝑝+𝑤𝑠∗𝑙)−𝑟
1+𝑟
. 
In case intra-group loss compensation is available, the taxable income of the parent entity is 
reduced due to the loss-making investment of the subsidiary. It follows that:130 
(10) 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 = −(1 − 𝐴) ∗ 𝑤𝑝 + (
1
1+𝑖
) ∗ [(𝑤𝑝 ∗ 𝑝𝑝 + 𝑤𝑠 ∗ 𝑙 + 𝑤𝑝 ∗ 𝛿) ∗ (1 + 𝜋) ∗ (1 − 𝜏) + 𝑤𝑝 ∗
(1 − 𝛿) ∗ (1 + 𝜋) ∗ (1 − 𝐴)]. 
Without such consolidation mechanism, no comparable tax relief is granted to the parent entity, 
however it has to bear the final loss of its affiliate which leads to: 
(11) 𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠 = −(1 − 𝐴) ∗ 𝑤𝑝 + (
𝑤𝑝
1+𝑖
) ∗ [(𝑝𝑝 + 𝛿) ∗ (1 + 𝜋) ∗ (1 − 𝜏) + (1 − 𝛿) ∗
(1 + 𝜋) ∗ (1 − 𝐴)] +
𝑤𝑠∗𝑙∗(1+𝜋)
1+𝑖
. 
Altogether, to evaluate the impact of the Marks & Spencer case on the establishment of an 
internal market, the amended EATR is represented as: 
(12) 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅 =
𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡
∗ −𝑅𝑠𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠/𝑛𝑜 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠
(𝑤𝑝∗𝑝𝑝+𝑤𝑠∗𝑙)
1+𝑟
. 
A.2.3. Amendments regarding the “Cadbury Schweppes” Case 
To analyse the impact of the Cadbury Schweppes case on investment conditions in the internal 
market, we follow the general approach of Bräutigam et al. (2017) and assume a cross-border 
investment of a parent company situated in one Member State that invests into a subsidiary 
located in any other Member State. 
                                                 
130 For simplicity, we do not consider non-profit taxes in the loss scenario. Such taxes would only be decisive at 
the level of the loss-making affiliate since they might induce substance taxation. However, as we consider a 
fixed amount of final losses, there is no further distinction on the composition of such losses. At parent level, 
non-profit taxes would not add value to the considerations and rather merely scale the results.  
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The EATR for a cross-border investment under the consideration of CFC rules is defined as:131 
(13) 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟
𝐶𝐹𝐶 = {
𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠−𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑑𝑒𝑟   𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦
≥ 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
  𝑖𝑓 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑠𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑟𝑦
< 𝐸𝐴𝑇𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐
𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡
∗ 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑
. 
In line with Bräutigam et al. (2017), we assume that the parent company finances its subsidiary 
by 100% new equity and is itself re-financed by 100% new equity.132 In contrast, however, we 
do not include potential (detrimental) second-round effects for intra-EU tax competition such 
as the increased implementation of patent box regimes, but merely focus on the immediate 
consequences of the Cadbury Schweppes case on Member States’ tax systems. Besides, 
Bräutigam et al. (2017) apply a strict specification for the applicability of CFC rules and disre-
gard Member States that follow the so-called jurisdictional approach for determining low-tax 
jurisdictions upon official black- or whitelists in their main analysis.133 In contrast, we do not 
distinguish the approaches of the underlying CFC rules. 
A.2.4. Amendments regarding the “National Grid Indus” Case 
To evaluate if the National Grid Indus case has contributed to a reduction of tax distortions in 
the internal market, we build on the approach of Evers and Spengel (2014) and consider the 
transfer of a self-created patent from the parent company to its foreign subsidiary. 134  
As displayed in Table A3, we consider four possible scenarios in our analysis: 
Table A3: Overview of amendments regarding the "National Grid Indus" case 
 Exit taxation No exit taxation Comparison with 
No capitalisation of 
self-created patent 
[1] 𝑅𝑒𝑥 [3] 𝑅𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑥 𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚 
Capitalisation of  
self-created patent 
[2] 𝑅𝑒𝑥,𝑐𝑎𝑝 [4] 𝑅𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑥,𝑐𝑎𝑝 𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚,𝑐𝑎𝑝 
Adjustment of A 𝐴𝑆𝐿,𝑆
𝑇𝑃  𝐴𝑠,𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑥
𝑇𝑃   
                                                 
131 For a detailed explanation and derivation of the formula, see Bräutigam et al. (2017), pp. 730 f. 
132 See Bräutigam et al. (2017), p. 730. We benchmark the outcome of the cross-border investment against a do-
mestic investment of the parent corporation that is likewise financed by 100% new equity. 
133 See Bräutigam et al. (2017), pp. 726, 740. 
134 The following description is based on and adapted from Evers/Spengel (2014), pp. 11-17 and Evers (2015), 
pp. 126-130 including detailed derivations of the formulas and explanations as well as further references. 
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In the first two scenarios, the Member State of the domestic parent imposes exit taxes on the 
transfer of patents. The amount of exit taxes is determined by the underlying transfer price 𝑇𝑃 
that – by assumption – corresponds to the earnings value (𝐸𝑉) of the patent:135 
(14) 𝐸𝑉 = (𝑝 + 𝛿) ∗
(1+𝜋)
𝑖+𝛿(1+𝜋)−𝜋
. 
Furthermore, the return from the exploitation of the patent is subject to tax under the rules of 
the Member State where the recipient resides. Upon straight-line depreciation at a periodical 
rate of 𝜑𝑠 over the patent’s useful life (𝑢𝑙), the present value of depreciation allowances in 
scenario 1 and 2 can be depicted as:136 
(15) 𝐴𝑆𝐿,𝑆
𝑇𝑃 = 𝜏𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑃 ∗ 𝜑𝑠 ∗ (
1
(1+𝑖)1
+ ⋯ +
1
(1+𝑖)𝑢𝑙
) = 𝜏𝑠 ∗ 𝑇𝑃 ∗
𝜑𝑠
𝑖
(1 −
1
(1+𝑖)𝑢𝑙
) with 
(16) 𝑢𝑙 =
1
𝜑𝑠
. 
In contrast to the second scenario, self-developed patents cannot be capitalised for tax purposes 
according to Member States national tax law in the first scenario and hence have a book value 
of zero.137 Thus, R&D costs are expensed immediately (𝜑0 = 100%) and shield part of the 
return from taxation at the level of the parent entity (expressed as 𝜑0 ∗ 𝜏𝑝).
138  
Taken together, when considering the transfer of a non-capitalised patent, exit taxation and the 
exploitation of a patent by the subsidiary,139 the standard return after taxes in the Devereux/Grif-
fith formula is modified to:140 
(17) 𝑅𝑒𝑥 = −(1 − 𝜑0𝜏𝑝 − 𝐴𝑠
𝑇𝑃) − (𝜏𝑝 ∗ 𝑇𝑃) +
(𝑝+𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)
1+𝑖
∗ (1 − 𝜏𝑠) +
(1−𝜑0𝜏𝑝−𝐴𝑠
𝑇𝑃+𝜏𝑝𝑇𝑃)∗(1−𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)
1+𝑖
. 
In the second scenario, national tax law of the transferring entity’s residence state requires the 
capitalisation of the patent. Therefore, only the difference between the transfer price and the 
book value is subject to exit tax. In this scenario, the book value of the patent corresponds to 
                                                 
135 See Evers/Spengel (2014), pp. 14-16; Evers (2015), pp. 128 f. 
136 See Evers/Spengel (2014), p. 13; Evers (2015), p. 127. 
137 In Cyprus, Portugal and Sweden, however, the capitalisation of self-developed patents is mandatory. In Slove-
nia, research costs cannot be capitalised whereas domestic law stipulates the capitalisation of development 
costs. Yet, we assume that there is no capitalisation of the patent in Slovenia and all related costs are immedi-
ately expensed for the quantitative analysis in Section 7.3. 
138 See Evers/Spengel (2014), p. 6; Evers et al. (2015), pp. 511 f.; Evers (2015), pp. 96 f. 
139 Within the two-period framework of the Devereux/Griffith model, the transfer takes place in the same period 
as the R&D investment and creation of the patent. See Evers/Spengel (2014), p. 12; Evers (2015), p. 127. 
140 See Evers/Spengel (2014), p. 11; Evers (2015), p. 126. 
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the costs of creating the patent (i.e. 1). This extends the formulas established by Evers and 
Spengel (2014) as follows: 
(18) 𝑅𝑒𝑥,𝑐𝑎𝑝 = −(1 − 𝐴𝑠
𝑇𝑃) − 𝜏𝑝 ∗ (𝑇𝑃 − 1) +
(𝑝+𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)∗(1−𝜏𝑠)
1+𝑖
+
(1−𝐴𝑠
𝑇𝑃+𝜏𝑝∗(𝑇𝑃−1))∗(1−𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)
1+𝑖
. 
To ensure consistency, we additionally account for a “step-up” in the value of the patent to the 
earnings value (i.e. the transfer price) in case the transferring entity is subject to exit taxes in its 
residence state. 
To account for a staggered recovery of exit taxes in the residence country of the parent entity 
over a period of 𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑓, we extend the formula proposed by Evers and Spengel (2014) as follows: 
(19) 𝐷𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑙(𝜏𝑝 ∗ 𝑇𝑃) =
1
𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑓
∗ (
1
1+𝑖
+ ⋯ +
1
(1+𝑖)
𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑓
) ∗ 𝜏𝑝 ∗ 𝑇𝑃 ∗ (1 + 𝜋) =
𝜏𝑝∗𝑇𝑃∗(1+𝜋)
𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑓
∗
1
𝑖
∗ (1 −
1
(1+𝑖)
𝑇𝑑𝑒𝑓
). 
In scenario 3 and 4, no exit taxes are imposed by the transferring entity’s residence state. Hence, 
the foreign subsidiary capitalises the patent based on its costs at a value of 1 without an eligible 
step-up. Equations (20) and (21) reflect the after-tax return if no exit taxes are levied for the 
cases of immediate deduction and capitalisation of R&D costs, respectively.  
(20) 𝑅𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑥 = −(1 − 𝜑0𝜏𝑝 − 𝐴𝑠,𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑥
𝑇𝑃 ) +
(𝑝+𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)∗(1−𝜏𝑠)
1+𝑖
+
(1−𝜑0𝜏𝑝−𝐴𝑠,𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑥
𝑇𝑃 )∗(1−𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)
1+𝑖
; 
(21) 𝑅𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑥,𝑐𝑎𝑝 = −(1 − 𝐴𝑠,𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑥
𝑇𝑃 ) +
(𝑝+𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)∗(1−𝜏𝑠)
1+𝑖
+
(1−𝐴𝑠,𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑥
𝑇𝑃 )∗(1−𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)
1+𝑖
. 
In both cases, equation (15) must be adjusted: 
(22) 𝐴𝑠,𝑛𝑜 𝑒𝑥
𝑇𝑃 = 𝜏𝑠 ∗ 1 ∗
𝜑𝑠
𝑖
∗ (1 −
1
(1+𝑖)𝑢𝑙
). 
As a benchmark, we compare the cross-border transfer of the patent to a purely domestic situ-
ation. If the patent is not capitalised under the laws of the Member State where the parent entity 
is resident, the return after taxes is calculated as: 
(23) 𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚 = −(1 − 𝜑0𝜏𝑝) +
(𝑝+𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)∗(1−𝜏𝑝)
1+𝑖
+
(1−𝜑0)∗(1−𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)
1+𝑖
. 
In turn, if R&D costs must be capitalised, the patent is depreciated according to domestic rules 
and the after-tax return is equal to: 
(24) 𝑅𝑑𝑜𝑚,𝑐𝑎𝑝 = −(1 − 𝐴𝑝) +
(𝑝+𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)∗(1−𝜏𝑝)
1+𝑖
+
(1−𝐴𝑝)∗(1−𝛿)∗(1+𝜋)
1+𝑖
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